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ABSTRACT

R obert H unter M orris was born in 1713 to one o f colonial A m erica’s
m ost prom inent families. From 1693 until 1746, his father, Lewis M orris, was
an im portant political leader in both New York and New Jersey. In 1738, the
elder M orris became governor of New Jersey. W orking alongside his father,
R obert H unter M orris earned a reputation as both a brilliant ju rist and a
stridently authoritarian politician.
In 1746, Thomas Penn became the chief proprietor o f Pennsylvania.
During the preceeding half century, Pennsylvania’s elected legislature had
steadily gained political and financial power at the expense o f the executive
authority embodied by the Penn family. Thomas Penn sought to restore the
predom inance he felt was his as proprietor. By the early 1750s, relations
betw een proprietor and Assembly had deteriorated into a political deadlock that
threatened to bring Pennsylvania’s governmental processes to a standstill.
Over the course o f the eighteenth century, Pennsylvania gradually
abandoned the Quaker principles of benevolence and honesty w hen acquiring
D elaw are Indian lands. A strong alliance between Pennsylvania’s governm ent
and the pro-British Iroquois had stripped the increasingly resentful Delawares o f
m uch o f their homeland. By the early 1750s, the French presence on the Ohio
River threatened Pennsylvania’s frontier. W ar between G reat Britain and
France loomed.
Into Pennsylvnia’s increasingly complex and dangerous situation, Thomas
Penn inserted the tactless and uncom prom ising Robert H unter M orris as
governor. A rriving in Philadelphia in October 1754, G overnor M orris
antagonized the pacifist Assembly at every turn and helped to w orsen an
already volatile political situation. He supported Thomas P enn’s designs on
Delaw are land while cynically attempting to m uster Indian support for the
B ritish m ilitary cam paign against the French. His desire to w in the favor of
both Penn and the British imperial authorities blinded him to the im portance of
securing the loyalty o f the Delawares on the Susquehanna and Ohio rivers.
Their violent uprising against Pennsylvania followed the British defeat on the
Ohio. W hile the undefended frontier burned, he dismissed longstanding
Delaw are grievances as fabrication and categorized the Indians who attacked the
Pennsylvania frontier as m ercenaries o f the French. M orris’s refusal to
com prom ise with the Assembly or to address Indian concerns m ade his
adm inistration a political and diplomatic failure. He left office in A ugust 1756.
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ROBERT H U N TER MORRIS AND THE POLITICS OF INDIAN A FFA IRS
IN PENNSYLVANIA, 1754-1755

INTRODUCTION

In October 1754, Robert Hunter M orris arrived in Philadelphia to take
up his duties as governor o f Pennsylvania.1 M orris served for only twenty-two
m onths, but his tenure embraced the collapse o f the seventy-year "Long Peace"
that had heretofore distinguished the colony from the rest of Great B ritain’s
N orth A m erican provinces. In July 1755, the French and Indian victory over
General Braddock’s army on land claimed by Pennsylvania heralded the Seven
Years W ar and punctuated the first half of M orris’s administration. In late
N ovem ber, the long-suffering Delawares launched an uprecedented w ar against
the colony’s w estern settlements that consumed the rem ainder o f his term .
Thomas Penn had bestowed the governorship on M orris with a m andate
to restore the declining pow er of the proprietary interest at the expense o f the
Quaker-dom inated Assembly. W hen w ar broke out on the frontier, M orris was
1 Thomas Penn, was in fact Pennsylvania’s governor by virtue of his position as
principal proprietor. If the proprietor resided in Pennsylvania, he would have
served as governor. Since Penn had elected to conduct his affairs from England
by this time, he appointed a series o f deputy or lieutenant governors to act in
his stead. In correspondence and in discourse, a deputy governor was addressed
and referred to simply as the "governor" and consequently that form will be
used here throughout. The deputy governor was bound by his com m ission "to
obey the expressed will o f his superior" through w ritten instructions issued by
the proprietor. See W illiam Robert Shepherd, History of Proprietary
Governm ent in Pennsylvania (New York, 1896), 474 ff.
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engaged in a bitter struggle with the legislature over m ilitary appropriations.
The form ulation of Pennsylvania’s response to the Delaware uprising forced the
issues o f proprietary land rights, the colony’s relations with the imperial
governm ent, the viability o f a pacifist legislature in time o f w ar, and the failure
of the provincial Indian policy into the general dispute betw een governor and
Assembly.
M orris was a vitriolic partisan poorly suited to manage a crisis that
called for a skilled political negotiator and diplomat who recognized the
importance of Pennsylvania’s Indian allies. His reputation for contentious
arrogance was well established when he became governor o f Pennsylvania. (In
fairness, he was also noted for his brilliant legal mind and as a capable
administrator). M orris served an intensive political apprenticeship under his
father, Lewis M orris, who had been one of colonial New Y ork’s m ost volatile
and self-serving party leaders. Lewis later brought a harsh and autocratic style
to the office of governor o f New Jersey. The younger M orris consistently
reflected his father’s m anner and ideology in his own legal and political career.
R obert Hunter M orris directed Pennsylvania’s Indian affairs guided almost
exclusively by the dual consideration of advancing Thomas Penn’s political
agenda and enhancing his own reputation within London’s imperial
administration.

CH A PTER I
ROBERT H U N TER MORRIS: THE M AKING OF A PO LITICIA N

Robert Hunter M orris was born in 1713 at M orrisania in W estchester
County, New York, the youngest son o f Lewis M orris and Isabella G raham
M o rris.2 His father was a landed aristocrat who derived his considerable
wealth from m anor estates in New Y ork and New Jersey and was intimately
involved in the politics o f both colonies.
As a provincial politician, Lewis .M orris was a volatile m ixture o f m oral
rectitude and calculated self-interest. His seemingly inexhaustable capacity for
charging into partisan disputes kept him at or near the center o f political
activity in his two home colonies for over half a century.3 The elder M orris
fostered his son’s entrance into both provincial and imperial political circles and

2 The D ictionary o f Am erican Biography incorrectly gives "c.1700" as the date
o f R .H . M orris’s birth. This error has made its way into both scholarly and
popular works on the colonial history o f Pennsylvania and it obscures M o rris’s
precocious entry into provincial politics. In fact, R .H . M orris was only fortyone years old w hen he became governor o f Pennsylvania in 1754 and had
already served as New Jersey’s chief justice for fifteen years. See J.A . K rout
"Robert H unter M orris" Dictionary of Am erican Biography (New York:
Scribner, 1943), XIII, 225; Beverly M cAnear, "An Am erican in London, 17351736," Pennsylvania Magazine o f History and Biography. LXIV, 2, 165;
Eugene R. Sheridan, Lewis M orris. 1671-1746 (Syracuse, 1981), 94.
3 Patricia Bonomi, A Factious People: Politics and Society in Colonial New
Y ork (New York, 1971), 104.
4
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profoundly influenced his public behavior. Robert Hunter M orris’s introduction
to politics apparently began at an early age. In his A utobiography. Benjamin
Franklin recounted that he had heard it was Lewis M orris’s custom to have his
children "dispute with one another for his D iversion while sitting at Table after
D inner."4
Lewis M orris first became involved in governm ent in New Jersey. In
1693, at the age o f of twenty-two, he was appointed to the New Jersey
provincial council.5 Eight years later, he travelled to England as the agent for
the East Jersey Board of Proprietors. His persuasive pleading before the Board
of Trade helped convince the imperial administration to grant New Jersey a
royal governm ent.6 M orris later shifted his prim ary political interests to New
York and there became a powerful m em ber o f the Assembly.
W hile serving in the New York legislature, M orris form ed a close
political alliance with Governor Robert Hunter who presided over the

4 The Autobiography of Beniamin Franklin. R. Jackson W ilson, ed.,(N ew
York, 1981), 166-67.
5 John E. Pom fret, The New Jersey Proprietors and Their Lands (Princeton,
1964), 83.
6 John E. Pom fret, Colonial New Jersey- A History (New York, 1973), 85.
D isturbed over the state o f political anarchy in New Jersey, M orris and his
sponsors on the East Jersey Board w ere convinced that royal governm ent would
allow the landed aristocracy to maintain control over the colony. See Sheridan,
Lewis M orris. 34.
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governments o f both New York and New Jersey from 1710 to 1719.7 The two
m en also developed a deep personal friendship attested to by M orris’s naming
his youngest son for the governor. In 1715, Lewis M orris was appointed chief
justice o f New York. He also served as an effective legislative m anager for
G overnor Hunter and the latter’s successor, W illiam B urnet.8 H unter aided
M orris in forging a strong legislative party initially "based upon patronage,
discipline, economic protection for artisans, shopkeepers, and yeom an farm ers,
and toleration for [religious] dissenters."9
But Lewis M orris was no champion of the masses. Behind the
"M orrisite" faction’s appeals to the middling classes lay a firm resolve toward
m aintaining New Y ork’s landed gentry as the dominant political pow er in the
colony. The M orrisites also opposed the growing influence o f New Y ork’s
urban m erchants.10 In New York, political factions m anipulated the electorate
in a continuous struggle for control of the Assembly and the furtherance o f their
respective economic and political interests. In the 1720s, the party headed by
Adolph Philipse, M orris’s chief rival, grew in influence. A fter the elections of

7 Patricia U. Bonomi, A Factious People. 79. From 1702 to 1738, New Y ork
and New Jersey were ruled by the same royal governor although each colony
possessed its ow n legislature and judiciaryes. See Pom fret, New Jersey
Proprietors and Their L ands, xi.
8 Sheridan, Lewis M orris. 94-96, 113-14, 123-24.
9 Kammen, Colonial New Y ork. 203.
io Sheridan, Lewis M orris. 118-19.
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1728, the M orrisites constituted the largest opposition group in the A ssem bly.11
In late 1732, W illiam Cosby became governor o f New York. W ithin a
few m onths M orris and the new governor became locked in a prolonged and
bitter conflict. Before C osby’s appointment, a New York m erchant nam ed Rip
V an Dam had served as interim governor. Citing a royal instruction, Cosby
dem anded half the salary that V an Dam had collected during his thirteen
m onths in office. Van Dam refused the governor’s order and Cosby resolved
to settle the m atter in court. W hen C hief Justice M orris attem pted to block the
governor’s legal strategy, Cosby quickly removed him from office.
M orris now headed what was commonly known as the "Country" party
against the "Court" party o f Governor Cosby and the Philipse faction. In the
m id-eighteenth century, the term s "court" and "country" carried political
m eaning throughout the British empire. The court party was popularly
understood to include those who controlled the inner workings o f a given
governm ent. The country faction, often comprise of landed gentry, ostensibly
represented the citizenry at larg e.12
Inflamed by what he saw as Cosby’s high-handed and irregular behavior,
M orris em barked on a crusade "which, in terms of ideology and tactics, was

11 Kam men, Colonial New Y ork. 203-205. The m ost complete discussion o f the
factionalism o f New Y ork provincial politics in the m id-eighteenth century and
the M orris-Cosby dispute can be found in Bonomi, A Factious People. 105,
140 ff.
\

12 Kam men, Colonial New Y ork. 203.
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the boldest and m ost imaginative political opposition in New Y ork before the
era of the A m erican R evolution." M orris broke with the partisan rhetoric used
in past disputes by framing his attacks against the governor in constitutional
term s. Despite being a political outsider at this point, he cast him self as a
defender of the royal prerogative, fending off the usurpations o f the governor
and calling into question the legitimacy o f the provincial judicial system.
M orris and the Country party began their struggle against Cosby and the C ourt
party w ithin the context o f provincial politics and carried it to the highest levels
o f the imperial administration in L ondon.13
M orris and his colleagues sought to turn public opinion against the
governor by tarring Cosby as an arbitrary and incompetent ruler. In late 1733,
M orris stood for election to a vacant seat in the Assembly representing the
borough o f W estchester. M orris designed his cam paign to serve as a
referendum on the Country party’s opposition to Cosby. The C ourt party
enlisted a candidate to run against M orris and the W estchester election drew the
attention o f the entire colony. M orris w on at the polls and proceeded to
M anhattan to take his newly-won seat in the Assembly. His arrival in the city
was m et with a resounding show of popular support. Governor Cosby
countered by adjourning the Assembly until the spring of 1734.14

13 Sheridan, Lewis M orris. 148, 156-57.
14 Ibid.; Bonomi, A Factious People, 114.
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Shortly after the election, the first issue of the New York W eekly
Journal appeared in print. Financed and largely w ritten by M orris and his
colleagues, the newspaper served as the mouthpiece for the Country party.
From its pages, the Country party levelled an unrelenting stream o f criticism at
the governor. M orris’s use o f a serial publication as a propaganda weapon
constituted a m ajor innovation which changed the course o f future political
campaigns in colonial New Y ork.15
M orris also criticized Cosby in letters and petitions to the Board o f
Trade and the Privy Council. The Country party’s second strategy in the
M orris-Cosby dispute was to carry the fight before the imperial authorities in
London and to apply for redress of grievances against the governor. In
N ovem ber M orris complained of poor health and slyly requested that he be
excused from attendance at the Assembly in order to return "home." He
prom ptly set sail for England as the agent for the Country p a rty .16
Robert Hunter M orris, then twenty-one, accompanied his father to
England and served as his private secretary. Like m ost m em bers o f the

15 Ibid., 137. The printer o f M orris’s New York W eekly Journal was John
Peter Zenger. In 1734, Cosby ordered the newspaper shut dow n and Zenger
was arrested for libel. Z enger’s subsequent trial and acquittal has traditionally
been hailed as a milestone in the "advancement" o f the free press in A m erican
history. The significance of the Zenger trial lies m ore in its dem onstration of
the growing importance of the political press. See Kammen, Colonial New
Y ork. 206-207.
16 Sheridan, Lewis M orris. 153, 162-63.

10
colonial elite, Lewis M orris seems to have regarded a prolonged exposure to
the intricacies of the imperial adm inistration (and London in general) as a fitting
capstone to his son’s education. During his year and a half in London, Robert
kept a diary o f his activities and documented the progress o f his father’s
m ission. M any o f the contacts the father and son established w ere w ith other
colonial agents and also naval officers with whom the elder M orris had becom e
acquainted in New York. Lewis found that London’s political scene had
changed since his visit thirty years earlier. The bureaucracy had grow n in size
and complexity and he found that obtaining access to governm ent officials had
becom e considerably m ore difficult.17
By the summer o f 1736, Lewis M orris had becom e thoroughly
disenchanted with London politics. His varied m achinations had failed to bring
about C osby’s rem oval and his appeals for reinstatem ent as chief justice were
denied by the Privy Council. W ith characteristic self-righteousness, both
M orrises returned to New York em bittered over what they saw as endemic
corruption within the royal governm ent.18 The London m ission signalled the
end o f Lewis M orris’s influence in New York, but his political career was far
from over.
The Duke o f Newcastle, the secretary of state for the southern

17 Ibid., 163; M cAnear, "An A m erican in London," 165, 170-71.
18 Ibid., 176; Sheridan, Lewis M orris. 176.
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departm ent, had offered Lewis M orris the governorship of New Jersey, which
was now to be made separate from that o f New York. In return, Newcastle
asked M orris to withdraw his charges against Cosby. W hile in London, M orris
stubbornly declined the offer on principle. M orris felt his personal honor
inextricably linked to his campaign against Cosby. H ow ever, the prospect of
obtaining a governorship rekindled his ambition. After his return to New Y ork
and the death o f G overnor Cosby, M orris actively sought the position. The
im perial officials who supported M orris’s appointm ent overestim ated his
residual political strength in New York. Their prim e objective in placing
M orris at the head o f New Jersey’s governm ent was to remove the quarrelsom e
party leader from the volatile political situation in New Y o rk .19
In August 1738, Lewis M orris took office as governor o f New Jersey.
Ensconced in a position o f executive authority, M orris quickly abandoned the
independent^ reform -m inded ideology he had espoused as the leader o f New
Y ork’s Country party. His distrust o f the imperial adm inistration was soon
supplanted by the realization that his position as governor depended upon
support from London. M orris no longer invoked the royal prerogative as a
lim itation on the pow er of New Y ork’s governor, but rather as a bulw ark
against the encroachm ents of the New Jersey Assem bly.20 Although nearing the

19 Ibid., 180; Bonomi A Factious People. 133-134.
20 Ibid., 182.
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age o f seventy, M orris had lost none o f his zeal for political combat. H istorian
John Pom fret has dem onstrated that as governor, M orris "strove unrem ittingly
to impose his will on the assembly and employed every weapon w ithin his
control, including the sanctity o f the governor’s instructions and frequent
appeals to the crow n and the prerogative."21
Historians have taken note o f the apparent contradictions in Lewis
M o rris’s political persona. M ichael Kammen allowed that the rapidly changing
political climate occasioned similar turnabouts in the governor’s
contem poraries. Nonetheless Kammen characterized M orris’s behavior during
the New Y ork factional struggles of the 1730s as that o f an "ideological
cham eleon."22 Patricia Bonomi suggested that historians have been "too eager"
to criticize M orris’s "courtly conduct" as governor of New Jersey and his role
in the political turm oil that ensued. In her opinion, M orris’s political
difficulties m ight be m ore readily explained by "his rigid personality than from
inconsistency o f principles."23
M orris’s m ost recent biographer, Eugene R. Sheridan, found nothing
"peculiar" about the governor’s espousal o f both court and country ideologies
except the "intensity" w ith which he could embrace either w hen confronted
w ith a political obstacle. For Sheridan, "the key to understanding M orris lies

21 Pom fret, Colonial New Jersey. 148.
22 Kam men, Colonial New Y ork. 205.
23 Bonomi, A Factious People, n.132.
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in his lifelong effort to uphold his pretensions as a landed aristocrat.” M orris,
Sheridan points out, consistently upheld the interests o f the aristocracy and saw
him self as ’’one of the natural leaders o f society whose guidance the lower
orders should accept and whose status royal officials should resp ect." W hile
M orris believed in balanced governm ent, "it seemed as if the only governm ents
he considered unbalanced were those controlled by his adversaries.”24
Robert Hunter M orris was both a close student and a beneficiary o f his
father’s governorship. The younger M orris began and ended his career as an
appointed official and never waged a political battle as an outsider, as his father
had done. W hile serving as his father’s secretary in London, he had proven
him self a trustworthy and competent assistant with a talent for political debate.
In his history of New York, W illiam Smith, Jr. later described R obert H unter
M orris as a "solicitor o f no m ean art and address."25 W hen Lewis received his
instructions as governor, he was no doubt pleased to find that his son, still only
in his m id-twenties, was listed among the provincial councillors.26 Father and
son worked closely together. R obert’s presence on the provincial council
allowed the governor to closely m onitor its activities while attending to other

24 Sheridan, Lewis M orris. 206.
25 W illiam Smith, J r., The History of the Province of N ew -Y ork. M ichael
Kammen, ed. (Cam bridge,M assachusetts, 1972), II, 114.
26 M cAnear "An A m erican in London," 166.
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business.27
W ithin a year Lewis appointed his son chief justice o f New Jersey, but
m ade a liberal gesture by placing the office beyond the governor’s control.
R obert was the first chief justice o f the province who held his com m ission
"during good behavior" rather than "during the royal pleasure."28 W hile the
charge o f nepotism could scarcely be avoided, the younger M orris exhibited a
capable (if biased) administrative hand while on the court.

"He came young

into the office o f chief justice," his contem porary, Samuel Smith noted, but
"stuck to punctuality in the forms o f the courts, reduced the pleadings to
precision and method, and possessed the great qualities o f his office, knowledge
and integrity, in m ore perfection than had often been known in the colonies. "29
In the 1740s, Robert H unter M orris became deeply involved in New
Jersey’s longstanding land problem s. Since the seventeenth-century, the socalled Nicolls patentees and the East Jersey proprietors had been adversaries in
a complicated dispute over land tenure in New Jersey.30 As a pow erful m em ber

27 Sheridan, Lewis M orris. 182.
28 J.A . Krout, "Robert Hunter M orris," 225.
29 Samuel Smith, The History of The Colony of Nova-Caesaria. or New-Jersey
(Burlington, New Jersey, 1765), 439.
30 In 1664, the Duke of York appointed Richard Nicolls as governor o f his
proprietary which then included the future colonies of New Y ork and New
Jersey. Nicolls issued two immense grants in East Jersey totalling 750,000
acres o f land. The recipients were largely Puritan settlers from Long Island.
U nbeknownst to Nicolls, the Duke o f York had granted the province o f New
Jersey to Sir George Carteret and Lord John Berkeley shortly thereafter. The
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of the provincial council, Robert worked to block legislation which m ight
benefit the patentees.31 The office of chief justice carried the authority to
com m ission the other justices of the court who in turn appointed the colony’s
law enforcem ent officials.32 In 1742, the younger M orris was appointed to the
East Jersey Board o f Proprietors.
By the m id-1740s, Robert Hunter M orris and James A lexander had
em erged as the leaders o f the proprietary interest.33 On behalf o f the East
Jersey Board they inundated the courts with lawsuits against small landholders
with questionable titles as well as outright squatters. In a m ajority o f the cases,
the proprietors succeeded in obtaining ejectments. The losers in these suits
w ere faced with the choice of leaving the land or becoming quitrent-paying
tenants.34

East Jersey proprietors derived their claim from Cateret and Berkeley and
m aintained that they were entitled to receive quitrents from the "Nicolls
patentees." The Duke o f Y ork’s subsequent disavowal o f the Nicolls grants and
num erous court rulings against individual patentees had failed to settle the
dispute by the middle of the eighteenth century. See Sheridan, Lewis M o rris.
18-20,198-99; Pom fret, New Jersey Proprietors and Their L ands. 8-10,56,10809.
31 Pom fret, Colonial New Jersey. 156.
32 Peter O. W acker, Land and People. A Cultural Geography o f Preindustrial
New Jersey: Origins and Settlement Patterns (New Brunswick, New Jersey,
1975), 354.
33 J.A . K rout "Robert Hunter M orris," XIII, 225; Sheridan, Lewis M o rris. 198.

34 Pom fret, Colonial New Jersey. 158.
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N ot only did M orris and the proprietors seek to invalidate the land
claims o f the Nicolls patentees, they sought to nullify land titles that some
settlers had obtained initially from the Delaware Indians. The proprietors
derisively characterized these titles as having been purchased "from strolling
Indians for a few Bottles of R um ."35 Between 1741 and 1743, the proprietors
brought several suits against white farm ers who traced their ownership to Indian
deeds. The proprietors w on virtually all the suits and w ere subsequently
accused o f jury tam pering by the frustrated "quitrenters."36 In 1749, M orris
struck at the very root of the Indian land title question w hen he argued against
Indian rights to the land on which the few remaining Delawares in New Jersey
w ere living.37
By 1745, M orris and Alexander had made significant gains against the
patentees in the courts. The East Jersey proprietors then sought to obtain a
com prehensive settlement in their favor. Jonathan Belcher and M orris had
spent three years preparing what became known as the Elizabethtown Bill in
Chancery. The bill challenged the land titles o f sixty prom inent patentees and
contained a compelling defense o f proprietary rights. According to law, the

35 Quoted in Pom fret, New Jersey Proprietors and Their L ands. 110. In 1683,
the New Jersey assembly had prohibited the purchase o f Indian lands except by
those who had obtained license from the governor. Subsequently, the purchase
o f Indian land had been placed under the control of the proprietors.
36 Ibid., 109
37 W acker, Land and People. 90.
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governor served as the judge on the New Jersey Court of Chancery. W ith
Lewis M orris on the bench, the patentees saw the verdict as a foregone
conclusion.38 Although m orally indefensible in the minds o f the besieged
patentees and their growing ranks o f sympathizers, the proprietors’ argum ents
rested on firm legal ground. W ith no other viable outlet, popular sentim ent
against the East Jersey Board erupted into violence. F or a decade the colony
was plagued with a series o f "land riots." Mobs attacked local jails to free
im prisoned patentees and those being held for removing tim ber from
unoccupied proprietary lands. The governor and council viewed these
disturbances as treasonable offenses and moved to suppress the law lessness.39
W hile few openly sanctioned the violence, many m em bers o f the newlyelected Assembly of 1746 echoed the grievances o f the rioters. W hen the
council drafted a stringent "anti-insurrection" bill over and above the existing
militia laws, the Assembly refused to pass it.40 Robert H unter M orris was
unm oved by the growing perception in the lower house that the East Jersey
proprietors were greedy predators bent on deepening the m isery o f the poor.
For him the issue was a simple m atter o f law versus anarchy. W ith the pow er

38 Pom fret, Colonial New Jersey. 153; Sheridan, Lewis M orris. 198.
39 Pom fret, Colonial New Jersey. 151, 156; Kem m erer, Path To Freedom .
198,200; Sheridan, Lewis M orris. 198. In the chapter entitled "M anifest
Destiny at the Proprietors’ Expense," Kem merer exposes the often specious
legal grounds on which New Jersey settlers based their land claims. See pp.
187-204.
40 K em m erer, Path to Freedom . 199.
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o f law on his side, M orris sought to push the proprietary advantage to the limit,
regardless o f the political or social consequences. After the first outbreak o f
violence, he expressed his thoughts on the rioters and their sym pathizers in a
few lines o f smug doggerel: "No m an is safe in property or fam e, W here laws
are broken or w here laws are lame, M uch less when force suspends all legal
right, M aking m en wrongfully submitt to might. "41
In 1748, C hief Justice M orris ordered John Ferdinand Paris, the East
Jersey B oard’s London agent, to petition the royal governm ent for troops to put
down the riots. M orris exhibited a somewhat inflated sense o f his own
im portance and apparently m isjudged the degree of urgency that New Jersey’s
sporadic land riots m ight arouse in London. Paris replied that he would speak
to the proper authorities, but calmly reminded the young chief justice that
B ritain was then at w ar on the continent and that there w ere "many other affairs
near hom e to employ our great m ens’ time & thoughts."42
In 1749, the New Jersey General Assembly sent a petition to King
George II in which they asserted their loyalty to the crow n but explained the
cause o f the disturbances in terms sympathetic to the rioters. The Assembly
portrayed the conflict as one o f rich against poor and hinted that a small
num ber o f test cases m ight have peacefully settled the land issue. Citing the

41 Quoted in ibid., 198.
42 Q uoted in ibid., 202.
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younger M orris and Alexander by name, the legislators complained that the two
proprietary leaders had shown a "Disposition to harass [the] People by a
M ultiplicity o f Suits." The Assembly subtly pointed out that M orris was in fact
a plaintiff in m ost o f the suits as well as the chief judicial authority in the
province. In addition, they charged that the patentees had been burdened w ith
"extraordinary and unnecessary Charges" in providing for their legal defense
and appealed on their behalf to the crow n "from whom they m ight expect
im partial Justice."43 In an effort to outflank the patentees, the East Jersey
Board had gone to the expense o f retaining the services of m ost o f the colony’s
practicing attorneys. One group o f patentees grew so frustrated in their attem pt
to secure legal counsel that they abandoned a test case against a proprietor.
Others w ere forced to hire lawyers from other colonies to defend them selves in
court.44
Lewis M orris died in May 1746 in the m idst of the land riots and the
continuing legal battles and Jonathan Belcher was appointed to succeed him.
Belcher had previously been m anuevered out o f the governorship of
M assachusetts after staunchly resisting his legislature’s popular attempts to pass
paper money bills. As one historian summed it up, the experience had

43 Quoted in W acker, Land and People. 354.
44 Pom fret, New Jersey Proprietors and Their L ands, 110; W acker, Land and
People, 355.
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impressed upon Belcher the notion that "to antagonize was not to ru le."45 The
new governor quickly earned the enmity of Robert H unter M orris and the
proprietors. M orris had hoped to succeed his father in office and was less than
enthusiastic over Belcher’s appointm ent.46 After his father’s death, by virtue o f
his positions as chief justice and leading m em ber o f the the provincial council,
R obert had been tem porarily in control o f New Jersey’s governm ent.47 Despite
B elcher’s conservative credentials, the proprietors w ere immediately suspicious
o f the governor’s connections with prom inent Quakers and his ambivalent
attitude toward proprietary estates and the collection o f quitrents.48
G overnor Belcher did not wish to alienate the Assembly. M uch to the
dismay o f the proprietors, Belcher allowed the passage of several money bills
which Governor Lewis M orris had repeatedly overturned. Furtherm ore,
Belcher seemed unwilling to press the legislature into taking action against the
rioters. M orris dismissed the governor’s cooperation with the Assembly as
incom petence and later asserted that Belcher was in sympathy with the rioters.49

45 Pom fret, Colonial New Jersey. 152,161.
46 Kem m erer, Path to Freedom . 209. During his last years, Lewis M orris had
attem pted to persuade the London authorities that in the event o f his sudden
death, the interest o f the colony would be best served by a standing
appointm ent for his son to become governor. K em m erer found that a
com m ission as governor had
47 M cA near, "An A m erican in London," 166.
48 Kem m erer, Path to Freedom . 208-09.
49 Ibid., 218-19; Pom fret Colonial New Jersey. 162.
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From London, John Ferdinand Paris wrote to M orris that B elcher’s
reluctance to act against the rioters had finally aroused the Board o f T rade’s
concern. The Board had considered the deployment o f royal troops to restore
order in New Jersey as well as the reunification o f the colony’s governorship
with that o f New York. Also at issue was the settlem ent o f the boundary
betw een the two colonies. A survey o f the boundary m eant that the East Jersey
proprietors stood to lose or gain several thousand acres o f land along the New
York line. W ith the attention o f the Board o f Trade draw n toward New Jersey,
fundamental changes in both imperial policy and governm ental appointments
affecting the colony seemed imminent. For the ambitious M orris, London
seemed rife with opportunity. So in late 1749 he set sail for England, but not
before w riting ahead to Paris asking that the proprietary agent urge the Board
o f Trade to withold any decisions on New Jersey pending his arrival.50
Historian Donald L. Kem m erer argued that M o rris’s forem ost objective
in going to England was to obtain a governorship. At the time of M orris’s
departure, B elcher’s future as governor of New Jersey seemed doubtful.51
H ow ever, M orris’s prospects w ere not limited to New Jersey. He had recently
found a political ally in Governor George Clinton o f New York. Ideologically,

50 K em m erer, Path to Freedom . 223; Pom fret, Colonial New Jersey. 163.
51 K em m erer, Path to Freedom . 224.
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both Clinton and M orris held staunchly imperialist views. C linton’s attempts to
induce the New York legislature to provide extensive financial support for King
G eorge’s W ar had m et w ith resistance. James De Lancey, the C hief Justice o f
New York, was Clinton’s chief political opponent. De Lancey form ed a
coalition of m erchants who shared a decidedly provincial outlook. They w ere
reluctant to support w ar m easures that would disrupt New Y ork’s lucrative fur
trade w ith French Canada and threaten relations with the Iroquois.52
On a m ore immediate level, the Clinton-M orris alliance hinged on a
m utual desire to curtail De L ancey’s influence in New York. De Lancey was
already a political thorn in Clinton’s side and M orris saw him as a threat to the
interests o f the East Jersey proprietors. C hief Justice De Lancey was to lead a
New Y ork delegation in the upcoming boundary settlem ent with New Jersey.
Clinton offered to support M orris for the office o f lieutenant-governor o f New
Y ork if the latter would present a m em orial against De Lancey to the king.53
Clinton would continue to hold the office of governor, but planned to return to
England, leaving M orris as his lieutenant to preside over the governm ent.54
M o rris’s willingness to jo in the fight against De Lancey stemm ed from m ore
than recent political developments. W illiam Smith observed that the New
Jersey chief justice "undertook the office with the m ore cheerfulness from the

52 Kam men, Colonial New Y ork. 306.
53 Kem m erer, Path to Freedom . 224.
54 M cA near, "An A m erican in London," 168.
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animosity which had long subsisted between the families o f M orris and De
L ancey."55
M orris rem ained in England for five years and returned to A m erica not
w ith the governorship o f New Jersey or New York but that o f Pennsylvania.
Jonathan Belcher continued as governor o f New Jersey until his death in 1757.
In London, M orris presented a persuasive case against Belcher, but the Board
of Trade considered his overw rought accusations to be extreme. Several New
Jersey petitions against the proprietors reached London, which provided the
Board w ith a m ore balanced view of the land troubles. John Pom fret rem arked
that M orris "as usual, pressed too h a rd ."56
In New York, Governor Clinton failed to secure a m ajority in the
General Assembly despite his unprecedented level of involvem ent in local
election campaigns. In 1750, De Lancey’s adherents won convincingly at the
polls. Clinton wrote to a sympathetic M orris in London asking that he "either
get the C. Justice or m yself rem oved, for it is impossible that I can m aintain his
[M ajesty’s] Prerogative in opposition to the Influence & crafty W iles o f him at
the head o f the Faction."57
A fter the election victories o f the De Lancey faction, political tensions

55 Smith, History o f New Y ork. II, 114.
56 Pom fret, Colonial New Jersey. 163-64.
57 Quoted in Bonomi, A Factious People. 162-63.

24
cooled in New Y ork.58 W hen the New Jersey Assembly passed an act
establishing the colony’s northern boundary, many New Y ork landowners
objected to the claim. Suddenly, Robert Hunter M orris’s close association w ith
the East Jersey proprietors became a political liability for George Clinton.
M o rris’s comm ission as lieutenant-governor sat unsigned on the secretary o f
state’s office in W hitehall for several months. Finally, in the interest o f
political harm ony, Clinton backed away from his support o f the contentious
M orris. De Lancey ultimately became New Y ork’s lieutenant governor. In
M ay 1752, a London agent closed a letter to the speaker o f the New Y ork
Assembly by assuring him that "the intended comm ission to M r. M orris as
Lieutenant Governor, is quite laid aside." The agent then continued that he
could not "conclude without expressing sincere wishes that a good
understanding may be restored between the several branches of your
Legislature. "59 M orris’s penchant for political dispute and his uncom prom ising
style had again thwarted his ambitions.
Convinced that his proven abilities would not be overlooked, M orris
continued to ingratiate him self with London’s political elite. He began building
on an earlier aquaintence with Thomas Penn while in London. His political
association w ith Penn had begun during the legal battles betw een the East

58 Kammen, Colonial New Y ork. 306.
59 Quoted in Smith, A History of New Y ork. 128.
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Jersey proprietors and the Nicolls patentees. As a m em ber o f Pennsylvania’s
proprietary family, Thomas Penn was concerned over the num ber o f New
Jersey squatters spilling westward over the Delaware River. Penn supported
and aided the legal efforts o f the East Jersey proprietors. In 1746, Thomas
Penn inherited his elder brother’s share of the family interest in Pennsylvania.
W ith a controlling three-fourths share, Penn became the principal proprietor of
the colony.60 In Decem ber 1749, M orris briefly noted in his diary that he had
m et with Penn. The proprietor offered to introduce M orris to the Duke of
Bedford, the secretary o f state for the southern departm ent and the official
responsible for political appointments in the royal colonies.61 Ultim ately, Penn
him self would fulfill M orris’s ambition for a colonial governorship.

60 W acker, Land and People. 359. Thomas Penn was the second son o f W illiam
Penn by his second m arriage. After the death o f his elder brother John in
1746, Thomas Penn became the controlling proprietor o f Pennsylvania. See
Charles P. Keith, Chronicles o f Pennsylvania (Philadelphia, 1917), II, 739-743,
886-887 for the circumstances and agreements under which the proprietorship
o f Pennsylvania devolved from W illiam Penn the founder to his sons and heirs.
61 M cA near, "An Am erican in London," 405. Only a small fragm ent survives
o f the diary that M orris kept in London from 1749 to 1754.

CHA PTER II
POLITICS AND INDIAN AFFAIRS IN PENN SY LVA NIA BEFORE 1754

I. The Proprietary Interest and Robert H unter M orris.

Thomas Penn harbored a bold political design w hen he became
proprietor and chief executive o f Pennsylvania in 1746. Penn had watched with
growing concern as the Assembly had increased its pow er over the previous
two decades. The new proprietor desired to roll back the political gains o f the
Assembly and to reassert the proprietary interest as a means o f restoring
balance to Pennsylvania’s government. Penn’s initiative rested ostensibly on
the W hig principle o f separation o f powers. He distrusted his legislature and
believed that it had engaged in a conscious and concerted effort to weaken the
executive’s authority.62
The rise of the Assembly was due less to calculation than to a series of
opportunities seized. H istorian Theodore Thayer rem arked that the
"extraordinary powers" granted the Assembly by the 1701 C harter o f Privileges
"were subject to broad construction in favor of republican governm ent, and the

62 James H. Hutson, Pennsylvania Politics. 1746-1770 (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1972), 6.
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Assembly made the m ost o f them ."63 In the two decades before Thomas P enn’s
ascendancy, the Assembly had maintained that its legislative authority emanated
from the colony’s royal charter and not from the proprietor.64 In such a climate
the maintenance o f the Penn fam ily’s prerogative and the desired balance
betw een legislature and executive demanded assertive proprietary leadership.
H ow ever, as W illiam S. Hanna argued, the A ssem bly’s path was cleared by the
"confusion, distraction, and poverty [that] were the hallm arks o f the proprietary
family after the death of W illiam Penn. "65
By 1750, the Assembly largely directed the colony’s finances. The
legislature held for its ow n use the interest derived from paper m oney bills and
also controlled the expenditure o f other sources of revenue. Thus provisioned,
the Assembly was able to cast its considerable influence at home as well as in
England virtually free from proprietary restraint. At the same time, the
Assembly sought to regulate proprietary income from tolls, fines, escheats,
licenses, and even the fam ily’s coveted quitrents. Penn saw the A ssem bly’s
com parative wealth as the source which enabled the legislators to infringe on
proprietary authority in a num ber o f areas, not the least o f which was Indian
............................—
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63 Theodore Thayer, Pennsylvania Politics and the Grow th o f Dem ocracy.
1740-1776 (Harrisburg: Pennsylvania Historical and M useum Com mission,
1953), 5.
64 Allen Rogers, Empire and Liberty: Am erican Resistance to British Authority,
1755-1763 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), 8.
65 W illiam S. Hanna, Benjamin Franklin and Pennsylvania Politics (Stanford,
Stanford University Press, 1964), 15.
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affairs.66
The dispersal o f presents among the indigenous Delawares and the other
tribes who settled within Pennsylvania’s boundaries was an integral part o f the
colony’s Indian policy. W hatever m easure o f Indian passivity and good will the
Assembly could not secure with honest dealing and respect for land rights, the
Q uaker legislators were m ore than willing to pay for. Given the relatively poor
financial status o f the proprietors, the Quaker-dom inated Assem bly spent
lavishly in the cause o f maintaining peaceful relations with its Indian neighbors.
Consequently, the Assembly reasoned that bearing the cost entitled the
legislature to an active role in directing Indian treaties and conferences.67 Penn
wished to lim it the Assem bly’s involvement with the m anagem ent o f Indian
affairs to financial support.
In 1748, Thomas Penn appointed James Ham ilton as the first in a
succession o f deputy governors through whom he hoped to reclaim his rightful
m easure o f authority. The Assembly initially approved o f Ham ilton, who was
the only native Pennsylvanian to serve as governor during the colonial period.
H ow ever, in July 1751, Penn launched his first strike at the source o f the
A ssem bly’s financial independence. He secretly directed Ham ilton to refuse his

66 Ib id., 6-7,41; Hutson, Pennsylvania Politics. 10.
67 H anna, Benjamin Franklin and Pennsylvania Politics. 6; W ilbur R. Jacobs,
Diplomacy and Indian Gifts: A nglo-French Rivalry Along the Ohio and
N orthw estern Frontiers. 1748-1763 (Stanford: Stanford U niversity Press, 1950),
18; A lbert T. Volwiler, George Croghan and the W estward M ovem ent. 17411782 (Cleveland: Arthur H. Clark, 1926), 56.
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assent to excise bills that did not allow the governor joint control over
expenditures. H am ilton w arned Penn to no avail that the Assembly would
"bounce violently, and be very angry." Penn’s directive touched off a
prolonged conflict. The A ssem bly’s antagonism toward proprietary instructions
and P enn’s insistence on predeterm ining the actions o f his governors w ould be
at the center o f m ost o f Pennsylvania’s political disputes for the next decade.68
H am ilton dutifully adhered to P enn’s instructions as relations w ith the
Assem bly grew m ore strained. In late 1753, after considerable w rangling, the
Assem bly was under the im pression that the governor was close to approving a
paper money bill. In an unexpected turnabout, Ham ilton refused the bill in a
m anner taken by the Assembly as a consummate example o f proprietary bad
faith. A lthough desperate to find a m eans of justifying his veto, the governor
regarded revealing the contents o f the proprietor’s instructions as politically

68 Hutson, Pennsylvania Politics. 7-13; Sister Joan De Lourdes Leonard, The
O rganization and Procedure o f the Pennsylvania Assem bly. 1682-1776
(Philadelphia, 1949), 58. In their respective studies o f m id-eighteenth-century
Pennsylvnia politics, H utson and Hanna offer disparate views o f the conflict
betw een the Assem bly and the proprietor. H utson’s treatm ent is highly critical
o f Thomas P enn’s handling of political affairs in the province. H utson argues
that P enn’s often unfounded suspicions about the Assembly and his covert
m ethods added unnecessary rancor to Pennsylvania politics. F or Hutson, the
Assem bly reflected the will of the colony’s citizens. H anna sees at least the
early stages o f the conflict as a dispute betw een rival groups o f elite politicians
each m otivated by self preservation. Hanna is far m ore sym pathetic tow ard
Thomas Penn and casts him in the role o f a well-m eaning reform er, see H anna,
Beniam in Franklin and Pennsylvania Politics. 17,52. F or a refutation o f
H anna’s w ork see Hutson "Benjamin Franklin and Pennsylvania Politics, 17511755: A R eappraisal." Pennsylvania M agazine o f H istory and Biography
[hereafter PM H B ], XCIII, no. 3 (1969), 303-371.
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unwise. Instead, he forestalled the bill by citing a long-ignored royal
instruction of 1740. Ham ilton declared that the instruction required him to
withold his approval unless a suspending clause was attached to the bill. The
Assembly was outraged. Before his insistence on the suspending clause, the
populace had been willing to disassociate Ham ilton from the m achinations of
the proprietor. M ost chose to regard the governor as reluctantly but loyally
bound by the instructions o f his superior in London. No longer. H am ilton’s
popularity in the colony declined rapidly.69
French encroachm ents in the west and the rum or of growing disaffection
by the Ohio Indians intensified the governor’s ongoing struggle with the
legislature. The pacifist m ajority in the Assembly dismissed H am ilton’s
frequent calls to action and displayed a reluctance to provide m ilitary funds to
defend the frontier.70 Exhausted by nearly two years o f continuous antagonism,
Ham ilton repeatedly asked Penn to accept his resignation. Penn relented but
was convinced that in the Assem bly’s eyes the governor’s withdrawal would
"look like throwing up a commission in the day o f battle."71
In waging his cam paign against the Assembly, P enn’s attempts to

69 H utson "Benjamin Franklin and Pennsylvania Politics," 328; W infred Trexler
Root, The Relations o f Pennsylvania with the British Governm ent. 1696-1765
(New York: U niversity o f Pennsylvania, 1912), 198-99.
70 Robert L .D . Davidson, W ar Comes to Quaker Pennsylvania. 1682-1756
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1957), 106-12.
71 Quoted in Nicholas W ainwright George Croghan. W ilderness Diplomat
(Chapel Hill: University o f N orth Carolina Press, 1959), 69-70.
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organize a cohesive proprietary party had been unsuccessful. Pennsylvania’s
citizens regarded the proprietary interest as exceedingly narrow and tended to
view the Assembly as representing "the whole people."72 In the m id-1750s,
Penn’s supporters w ere mostly wealthy, self-interested m en whose political
activity extended only to accepting executive appointments and other patronage.
M any o f Pennsylvania’s non-Quaker elites regarded partisan politics as
unseem ly. Between 1754 and 1764, only two of the thirty-six m em bers o f the
Assembly w ere avowed proprietary supporters. In the troubled latter stages of
his governorship, Ham ilton found that many m en in the proprietary ranks
declined his appointments for fear of becoming politically tainted by the
association.73 In England, Thomas Penn found it equally difficult to fill the
highest positions in Pennsylvania’s government.

"M en o f the first rank did not

seek the G overnorship," W illiam S. Hanna argued "because the pay was not
large and the difficulties with the Assembly had given it a bad reputation in
England. "74
In May 1754, Penn m et with Robert Hunter M orris in London and
appointed him deputy governor of Pennsylvania. M orris posted a perform ance

72 A llen Tully, W illiam Penn’s Legacy: Politics and Social Structure in
Provincial Pennsylvania. 1726-1755. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1977), 94.
73 Hanna, Benjamin Franklin and Pennsylvania Politics. 18-20,45; G.B. W arden
"The Proprietary Group in Pennsylvania, 1754-1764" W illiam and M arv
Q uarterly. Third Series, XXI, 3 (July 1964), 383.
74 Hanna, Beniamin Franklin and Pennsylvania Politics. 19-20.
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bond o f five thousand pounds which Penn required o f his deputy governors to
insure their adherence to his instructions. M orris was prom ised an annual
incom e o f fifteen hundred pounds. Two-thirds of M orris’s pay would have to
be obtained from the Assembly, which had a history o f witholding salaries as a
m eans o f wringing legislative approval from stubborn governors. Penn also
insisted that M orris provide twelve m onths’ notice of his resignation.75
In M orris, Penn had found a seasoned and strong-willed if shrill
com batant who could be counted on to take the political offensive against the
Assembly. Yet, beyond Penn’s desire to place a strong advocate o f the
proprietary interest at the head o f the government, a punitive undercurrent ran
beneath the appointment. H istorian Francis Jennings concluded that Penn was
in the process o f waging a "personal war" against the Assem bly, w ith the
prim ary objective o f discrediting the Quaker elite.76 M orris was a prom inent
m em ber o f the East Jersey proprietors, a group that had displayed little
tolerance toward Q uakers.77
Penn’s desire to contain the Assem bly’s influence outweighed w hatever

75 Articles o f Agreem ent, Robert H unter M orris Papers, Volum e I, 55. New
Jersey H istorical Society; Shepherd, History o f Proprietary G overnm ent in
Pennsylvania. 455-456.
76 Francis Jennings, Empire o f Fortune: Crowns. Colonies, and Tribes in the
Seven Years W ar in Am erica (New York: Norton, 1988), 141-142.
77 K em m erer, Path to Freedom . 164. As governor o f New Jersey, Lewis M orris
had opposed the Quakers on fiscal and m ilitary m atters and sought to
disenfranchise m em bers o f the sect.
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concern he felt for the stability o f the already deadlocked provincial
governm ent. W hen Penn contemplated his new deputy’s likely impact on
Pennsylvania, he m ust have considered the often violent reactions that M orris’s
defense o f proprietary prerogative had provoked in New Jersey and the
contem pt w hich many in the legislature felt toward him. In Pennsylvania,
M orris would be confronted with an already heated dispute and a far m ore
pow erful legislature. In the past, disparate factions of provincial and im perial
officials had at different times worked to m anuever both M orris and his father
away from the similarly charged atmosphere of New York politics in the
interest o f diffusing potential upheavals.
Pennsylvanians were well aware o f M orris’s reputation in New Jersey.
There w ere few provincial politicians m ore roundly disliked. Richard Hockley,
one o f P enn’s agents in Philadelphia, candidly assessed the public attitude
tow ard M orris’s impending arrival.

"Some call him a T yrant," Hockley bluntly

told Penn, "others say you m ight as well have sent the Devil and have in this
Instance, shew ’d your great regard for the Province, the m ost m odest say ’tis
the m ost unfortunate thing that has happen’d to Pensilvania, and he shall sitt in
hott W ater if he shews his Jersey airs."78
M orris clearly relished the challenge of taking on the Pennsylvania
Assembly. Benjamin Franlin unexpectedly m et the new governor in New Y ork

78 Quoted in M abel Pauline W olff The Colonial Agency o f Pennsylvania. 17121757 (Philadelphia, 1933), 157.
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as the latter was en route from London to Philadelphia. The two had long been
acquainted and w ere on friendly term s.79 W hen asked, Franklin advised M orris
that he m ight avoid having an "uncomfortable" adm inistration by keeping clear
o f quarrels with the Assembly. M orris coyly protested that "Disputing" was
one o f his "greatest pleasures," but that on consideration o f F ranklin’s advice
he would avoid such situations "if possible."80
On October 3, 1754, M orris arrived in Philadelphia. By training if not
by tem peram ent, he was prepared to undertake the routine adm inistrative and
political responsibilties o f his office. Despite the obligatory pleasantries and
assurances o f good will from both the new governor and Speaker Isaac N orris,
the battle over proprietary rights was quickly renew ed.81 Had the crisis
brew ing on the Ohio not erupted and spread eastward during his tenure,
M o rris’s term in office m ight "only" have been notable as a m ore strident
continuation o f H am ilton’s struggle with the A ssem bly.82

79 M orris had been a corresponding m em ber o f the Am erican Philosophical
Society since 1744 and despite their political differences the two m en apparently
enjoyed each other’s company in social settings. See Davidson, W ar Comes To
Q uaker Pennsylvania. 126; Franklin, A utobiography. 167-68.
80 Ibid.. 166-67.
81 Colonial Records: Minutes o f the Provincial Council o f Pennsylvania
[hereafter cited as PCR] (Harrisburg: Theo. Fenn & C o., 1851), Volume
VI, 166-68 ; Hanna, Benjamin Franklin and Pennsylvania Politics. 59.
82 Hutson, Pennsylvania Politics. 14.
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II. Pennsylvania Indian Affairs Before 1754.

W illiam Penn believed that the Quaker ideal o f universal brotherhood
should guide the colony’s dealings with the Indians. Before sailing for
Am erica, he had resolved to w in the Indians’ friendship as well as their land.
Penn was not bound to recognize native land rights under the charter granted
Pennsylvania by King Charles II. Nonetheless, the proprietor acknowledged
the D elaw ares’ ownership o f the territory he planned to open for settlement.
U nder Penn’s direction, land purchases required Indian consent. Settlement
would be perm itted only on land to which the proprietors had established clear
title.83 In the eighteenth century, Pennsylvania’s Indian relations w ere defined
by trade and the acquisition o f land. W illiam Penn’s legacy o f good will eased
the friction betw een Pennsylvania’s whites and Indians well enough to allow the
colony to expand peacefully in both wealth and size.84
W hile W illiam Penn’s benevolent intentions provided the impetus for the

83 Isaac Sharpless, A History of Quaker Government in
Pennsylvania.(Philadelphia: T.S. Leach, 1900), I, 156-57; Shepherd, History o f
Proprietary Governm ent in Pennsylvania.96: C .A . W eslager, The Delaware
Indians: A H istory. (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1972), 156-58.
84 During Penn’s years in the new colony Indian relations w ere seldom as
cohesive as has traditionally been portrayed. How ever, Gary B. Nash w rote that
Indians relations "were far less abrasive than in other colonies." Gary B. Nash,
Quakers and Politics: Pennsylvania. 1681-1726 (Princeton: Princeton U niversity
Press, 1968), 87. See also Shepherd, Proprietary Governm ent in Pennsylvania.
95-96 and W eslager, The Delaware Indians. 169-70 for discussions o f the often
overstated amity betw een whites and Indians in early Pennsylvania.
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colony’s expansion, the m ore assertive James Logan, the colony’s provincial
secretary, largely form ulated Pennsylvania’s Indian policy.85 Logan was a loyal
protege of the proprietor but, as Francis Jennings wrote, "he did not share
P enn’s scruples" in his dealings with the Indians.86 Logan amassed a
considerable fortune from the Indian trade. From 1701 until his retirem ent
from public affairs in 1747, he headed the proprietary Com m issioners o f
Property through which he directed and oversaw the purchase o f land from the
Delawares. Although the adm inistration o f Indian affairs was the duty o f the
governor, m ost who held the office deferred to Logan’s influence and
expertise.87 Logan’s dom ination of Pennsylvania’s Indian trade provided him
w ith the means to benefit directly from proprietary land purchases.
Speculation in proprietary land proved to be even m ore lucrative than trade.
L ogan secured the lands of the eastern Delawares through aggressive and often
dishonest tactics.88
The grow th of Pennsylvania’s economy relied in large m easure on the
Indian trade. Peltry provided Pennsylvania with m uch needed capital from

85 Julian P. Boyd, ed. Indian Treaties Printed by Benjamin Franklin. 1736-1762
(Philadelphia: Historical Society o f Pennsylvania, 1938), xix; Charles P. Keith
Chronicles o f Pennsylvania from the English Revolution to the Peace o f Aix-laChapelle. 1688-1748 (Philadelphia: Patterson & W hite, 1917), II, 708-709.
86 Francis Jennings, The Ambiguous Iroquois Empire (New York: N orton,
1984), 248.
87 Ibid., 248.
88 Ibid., 267, 271-72.
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Europe. By 1710 Indians as far west as the Susquehanna w ere largely
dependent on English trade goods. The success of Pennsylvania’s trade
depended on a productive body o f hunting Indians whose presence in turn posed
an im pedim ent to white settlement. Indian groups were thus draw n to the
Susquehanna by trade only to be driven further west by advancing settlem ent.89
By the early eighteenth century, the Six Nations o f New Y ork had
claim ed the Susquehanna Valley and established control over its native
inhabitants. The nature o f Iroquois dominance over Pennsylvania’s Indians,
especially the means by which the Six Nations subjugated the D elawares, has
been subject to different interpretations. The traditional view holds that the
Iroquois had subdued the Delawares by conquest or intim idation and forced
them to assume the powerless and humiliating role of "women" in the Covenant
C hain.90 Francis Jennings found the meaning o f the D elaw ares’ role as
"women" to be m ore subtle and varied. He argued that the Iroquois-D elaw are
relationship was not one of simple dominance and that the female assignation
was in fact a "misleading m etaphor." Jennings argued that the Iroquois conquest
o f the Delawares was a "myth" and he interpreted their status as "women" as a

89 Francis Jennings "M iquon’s Passing: Indian-European Relations in Colonial
Pennsylvania, 1674-1755" (Ph.D . diss., University o f Pennsylvania, 1965), 5-8;
Jennings, The Ambiguous Iroquois E m pire. 267.
90 See Thayer, A History of Quaker Government in Pennsylvania. 174-175; C.
H ale Sipe, The Indian W ars o f Pennsylvania (Harrisburg: Telegraph Press,
1931), 41-42; W eslager, The Delaware Indians. 181.
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functional rather than hierarchical role.91
Beginning in the late seventeenth century and continuing into the m iddle
o f the eighteenth, large numbers of Indians sought refuge in Pennsylvania from
w ar and white encroachment. M ost settled near the Susquehanna. Several
groups o f Shawnees from the west and south em igrated to different parts of
Pennsylvania. O f the two largest Shawnee contingents, one settled along the
Susquehanna near the Conestoga Indians and the other in the W yom ing Vallley.
F or nearly a century, successive bands o f Tuscaroras settled in Pennsylvania as
part o f their larger m igration from N orth Carolina to New York. Some o f the
Tuscaroras rem ained in the Juniata Valley until the outbreak o f w ar in 1755.
Sm aller Indian groups who came to the province included Tutelos from the
V irginia piedm ont, Nanticokes from eastern M aryland, the Piscataway from
w estern M aryland, and the Twightwees from Virginia and N orth C arolina.92
By the 1720s, the Delawares and Shawnees w ere growing restive under
the relentless advance o f white settlers. The fertile Tulpehocken Valley,
located on the upper reaches of the Schuylkill River, had become a haven for
the displaced Delawares from the east and the newly arrived Shawnees. In
1723, Tulpehocken had yet to be purchased by the proprietors w hen Palatine
G erm an settlers moved into the valley and began clearing the land. Some

91 Jennings, "M iquon’s Passing," 18-20.
92 Sipe, The Indian W ars o f Pennsylvania. 45-58; W eslager, The D elaw are
Indians. 182.
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Indians grudgingly set out for the Susquehanna and the Ohio, but not before
they had m ade their resentm ent known to Pennsylvania’s governm ent. In 1732,
the Delaware chief Sassoonan, aging and consumed by alcohol, was finally
pressured by proprietary agents into granting a deed for the Tulpehocken land.
On the upper Delaware River, Indians w ere also being displaced, often
violently, by Scots-Irish settlers who bore little regard for Q uaker scruples.93
Increasingly, land purchases followed white settlement rather than initiating it
as the first proprietor had envisioned.

Logan faced a serious dilemma. He

was acutely aw are that Pennsylvania could not count on the quiescence o f the
D elawares and Shawnees indefinitely. Land-hungry Germans and Scots-Irish
w ere arriving in ever-increasing numbers. The Quaker Assembly would
withhold its support from any m ilitary venture and there was clearly trouble on
the frontier. Fortunately for Logan and Pennsylvania, the Six Nations at the
same time w ere strengthening their hold on the Indians along the Susquehanna.
In the late 1720s, the Iroquois sent the Oneida chief, Shickelamy, to the
Susquehanna to act as viceroy over the client tribes. Shickelamy established his
base at Shamokin, an Indian town strategically located at the juncture o f the
east and west branches of the Susquehanna R iver.94
James Logan worked to establish a strong alliance with the Iroquois and

93 Paul A. W . W allace Conrad W eiser. Freind of Colonist and M ohawk
(Philadelphia: U niversity o f Pennsylvania Press, 1945), 41-44; W eslager, The
D elaware Indians. 184-85.
94 W allace, C onrad W eiser. 44; Sipe, The Indian W ars o f Pennsylvania. 45.
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to encourage their dominance over Pennsylvania’s Indians.95 As Thomas Penn
expressed it, the intent o f Pennsylvania’s new Indian policy was to enable the
Six Nations "to be better answerable for their T ributaries."96 Francis Jennings
has argued that Logan "permitted him self to believe that Pennsylvania’s native
Indians could be dispensed with if only the Iroquois could be kept in the
province’s interest."97 Increasing tensions with New Y ork and w ith the French
in the west made the alliance attractive to the Six Nations as well. The
Iroquois desired English recognition o f their claim to the Susquehanna and
acknowledgem ent o f their preem inence over all of the northern tribes.98
W ith the form ation of the Iroquois alliance, Conrad W eiser em erged as
Pennsylvania’s chief operative in Indian affairs. W eiser was o f Germ an birth
and an adopted M ohawk. He had developed close ties w ith the G reat Council
at Onondaga before settling in Pennsylvania. Although styled simply the
provincial interpreter, W eiser embodied Pennsylvania’s "new Indian policy ."99
Paul A .W . W allace wrote that the Six Nations regarded W eiser as "their

95 Boyd, ed., Indian Treaties Printed by Beniamin F ranklin, xx.
96 Quoted in W allace, Conrad W eiser. 44.
97 Jennings, "M iquon’s Passing," 379.
98 Ibid., 392.
99 Carl W eslager in The Delaware Indians. 172-95 and W allace in Conrad
W eiser. 39-49, both entitled chapters with the term "new Indian policy" in
discussing the Pennsylvania- Iroquois alliance.
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m an ."100
In 1742, Pennsylvania and the Six Nations conspired to strip the
D elawares o f their land rights in Pennsylvania and to rem ove them from the
forks o f the Delaware R iver.101 According to Jennings, the signing o f the
Treaty o f Lancaster o f 1744 m arked the zenith of the Six N ations’ power.
H ow ever, the Six N ations’ m ore aggressive policy toward their tributary tribes
ultim ately began to undercut their strength.102 By the early 1730s, Delawares
and Shawnees had begun to settle in the Ohio Valley. Iroquois people moved
there as well. The Six N ations’ control over the Ohio Indians began to lessen
as the French began moving down the river in the 1740s.103
By the 1750s, the "Long Peace" was on the verge o f collapse. Since the
founding of Pennsylvania over seventy years earlier, peace had been maintained
betw een Pennsylvania and its neighboring Indians. How ever, Pennsylvania’s
governors had long been guilty o f a perfunctory regard for the colony’s Indian
affairs while the Assembly had chosen to ignore the implications o f the growing
French presence on the frontier.
Three months before Robert Hunter M orris arrived in Philadelphia,
G eorge W ashington and a group of militiamen had been forced by the French

100 Ibid., 46
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to surrender Fort Necessity and leave the Ohio country. A contingent o f
D elaw ares, Shawnees, and M ingoes --supposed friends o f the English— w ere
among the m ost eager participants in the French capture o f W ashington’s force.
A fter the engagement, the Indians destroyed the livestock and carried off the
supplies o f W ashington’s defeated garrison. Ironically, the English traders with
W ashington’s party knew many o f the Indians by nam e.104 M orris had
anticipated the challenge of advancing the proprietary interest against the
Assembly. But as he entered the governorship, he faced the even m ore
daunting task o f retaining the loyalty o f those Delawares not already turned by
the French seizure o f the Ohio.

104 Law rence Henry Gipson, The British Em pire Before the A m erican
Revolution (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1946), VI, 41.

CHA PTER III
ROBERT H U N TER MORRIS AND TH E POLITICS OF IND IA N A FFA IRS
THROUGH BRAD DOCK’S DEFEA T

Recent scholars o f the Seven Years W ar in Pennsylvania have recognized
that the Delawares and Shawnees had ample and longstanding reasons for
attacking the colony’s frontier in 1755 and 1756. Francis Jennings w rote that
the D elaw are w ar against Pennsylvania "had been in the making, gradually
acquiring force and implacability, for decades."105 Similarly, Carl W eslager
traced the alienation o f the Delawares to James L ogan’s redirection o f
Pennsylvania’s Indian policy toward the Six N ations.106
The Indians had m ore than vengeful bloodletting in m ind w hen they
struck the Pennsylvanians. Stephen F. Auth argued that the D elawares, no less
than the French and English, fought for their own interests and pursued their
ow n strategy. H ow ever, the Delawares possessed a narrow er range o f options
owing to the shifting fortunes o f the m ore powerful French, British, and
Iroquois. Auth showed that earlier scholars dismissed the existence o f Indian
m otives behind Pennsylvania’s frontier wars in the 1750s and portrayed the

105 Francis Jennings, "The Delaware Interregnum ," PM H B . LXXXIX (1965),
174.
106 W eslager, The Delaware Indians. 193.
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natives as easily manipulated by whites. According to Auth, historians Francis
Parkm an, George Bancroft, Lawrence Henry Gibson, and A .F .C . W allace
agreed in effect that "the Indians’ attitudes were irrelevant to the conflict."107
Auth argued that a "historical consensus has em erged from the belief that
Indians w ere peculiarly irrational creatures incapable o f long-range calculation
and planning."108
In 1940, Randall C. Downes sought to explain the causes o f
Pennsylvania’s frontier w ar in his study o f Indian affairs on the upper Ohio.
His conception of the Indian psyche illustrates the simplistic characterizations
that Jennings and A uth have attempted to correct. Downes believed that the
eighteeenth-century French historian M ichel Pouchot possessed a "rare
understanding" o f the process that drove the Indians to war.

"The Indian,"

Pouchot had w ritten, "abuses him self because he feels too m uch." Unable to
suppress their violent urges, the Indians abandoned their ow n interests and
allowed themselves to be used as "instruments o f hatred" by the French and
English. Drawing upon Pouchot, Downes concluded that once they had w orked
the initially reticent Indians past the brink o f rage, the French "could not have
stopped the m urderous w arfare of 1755-1757 even if they had wished to ." 109

107 Stephen F. Auth, The Ten Years W ar: Indian-W hite Relations in
Pennsylvania. 1755-1756 (New York: Garland Publishing, 1989), 1-4,8.
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Jennings and Auth would agree that the French had minim al control over the
Indian w ar parties, but for a m arkedly different reason. The Delawares and
their prim ary allies, the Shawnees, fought not for the French, but to preserve
their own lands from white settlem ent.110
Robert Hunter M orris regarded the Susquehanna Delawares as slavish
and unwieldy subjects best left to the immediate supervision o f the Six Nations.
He judged the Susquehanna tributary tribes to be in a state o f "Subjection and
Dependency upon the Six Nations." W hen the D elaw ares’ assault on the
frontier suggested otherwise, he argued that they had "sold themselves" to the
French, whom he described as their "New M asters."111 M orris’s understanding
o f the frontier w ar was based on his belief that the Delawares and Shawnees
w ere little m ore than capricious m ercenaries.

"Indians are o f a m artial Spirit,"

M orris later explained to the Assembly "and in such a Season as this m ust be in
A ctio n."112
W hen M orris became governor, he saw the threat o f hostilities emanating
solely from French operations on the Ohio. A convincing display o f
Pennsylvania’s willingness to fight and resist the French was the only way to
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retain the loyalty of the Ohio Indians. However, M orris faced slim prospects
for arm ing the frontier. Bound by the proprietor’s instructions, M o rris’s
predecessor, Governor James Ham ilton, had refused to the last to accept funds
for the defense o f the province on the A ssem bly’s term s.113
In an informal meeting on October 15, 1754, M orris confronted the
Assem bly for the first time. He summoned the legislators to the Council
Cham ber and in the king’s name urged them to "exert" them selves in the
defense o f Pennsylvania. M orris laid no specific proposal before his audience.
Instead, he emphasized the "avowed Resolution" o f the French "to make
them selves M asters o f this Country" and the possibility o f "open W ar." M orris
set the ongoing pow er struggle betw een proprietor and legislature aside. By
inference, he sought to m ake the A ssem bly’s resistance to the p roprietor’s will
and their steadfast pacifism appear dangerously short-sighted. He did not try to
shake their political and religious convictions, but appealed to their identity as
Englishm en and the rights which British citizenship afforded them . M orris
attem pted to persuade them that allowing a French victory in N orth A m erica
was a far greater betrayal of Quaker principles than casting votes in favor of
m ilitary defense.

"I am sure I need only m ention to You the arbitrary and

tyrannical Nature of their Governm ent," M orris suggested, "and the detestable

113 H am ilton to the Assembly, August 16, 1754, Colonial Records: M inutes of
the Provincial Council of Pennsylvania. 16 vols. (Harrisburg: Theo. Fenn &
C o ., 1851) [herafter cited as CR], 6:139-40.
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Principles o f their Religion to convince You o f the unhappy Condition these
Colonies will be reduced to should they ever become subject to the F re n c h ."114
M orris was aware that many of the Ohio Delawares and Shawnees had
established ties with the French after W ashington’s surrender at Fort Necessity.
He m ade only a single reference to the role the Indians m ight play in a w ar
w ith France. He warned the legislators that the French "may not only annoy us
by the Indians in their alliance, but can at any time m arch a Body o f Troops
into this plentiful P rovince."115 Behind every Indian word and deed hostile to
Pennsylvania, M orris saw the hand o f the French who used "every Artifice to
corrupt & alienate them from our Interest."116
W hen M orris first arrived in Philadelphia, the French had already
established an imposing presence on the Ohio. Some Indians had joined the
French, while others fled the new European sphere of influence. The
overw helm ing m ajority of the Ohio Indians were now free o f Iroquois
supervision and could deal openly with the French. Tanacharison and
Scarroyady, Iroquois vice-regents o f the Ohio tributary tribes, led over two
hundred "loyal" Indians eastw ard.117 These Iroquois chiefs settled their large
band at Aughwick, an isolated frontier trading plantation belonging to George

114 M orris to the Assembly, October 15, 1754, CR 6:166-67.
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Croghan. By the autumn of 1754, Aughwick was crow ded with both Indians
and English traders who had been driven from the O hio.118 W ith the presence
of the Iroquois leaders, Croghan’s plantation now sheltered a governm ent in
exile for the Ohio axis o f the Pennsylvania-Six Nations alliance. The Indians at
Aughw ick w ere housed in cabins scattered over a radius o f a few miles and
w ere relatively well fed from Croghan’s corn fields and vegetable patches.
H ow ever, dysentery and a steady supply o f liquor smuggled into the camp took
their toll on the refugees.119
In the waning days of his governorship, James Ham ilton sent C onrad
W eiser to A ughw ick with orders to report on the "Dispositions and future
Intentions" o f the two Iroquois chiefs and the Ohio tribesm en "respecting the
Hostilities o f the F ren ch ."120 W eiser learned that the Senecas, an Iroquois tribe
w ith ties to both the French and English, had ordered the Ohio Indians to
rem ain neutral until further instructions arrived from the Six Nations. O n the
other hand, the M ohawks, Oneidas, and Tuscaroras had declared their
willingness to fight the French provided they were joined by the English.
W eiser observed not only a growing division among the Six Nations, but also
signs that Iroquois control over the tributaries had begun to wane. The
D elawares and Shawnees had form ed a close alliance and both w ere being
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courted by the French on the Ohio. At W inchester the year before, the
Delaware chief Beaver had openly violated Iroquois diplomatic protocol w hen
he bypassed the Six Nations and spoke directly to the English on behalf o f the
Shawnees. Beaver continued the defiant practice at Aughwick. Scarroyady, an
Oneida chief, was the Iroquois supervisor of the Ohio Shawnees. A t A ughw ick
he was visibly angered when he discovered that his charges had failed to
consult him w hen approached by a Twightwee w ar party eager to fight the
French. The Shawnees had rejected the overtures o f the Twightwees and
refused to jo in them. The Twightwee band then left in frustration.121
The proprietary authorities contemplated the wisdom of continuing to
acknowledge the supremacy o f the Iroquois on the Ohio. The allegiance o f the
Ohio Delawares and Shawnees might ultimately prove m ore valuable than that
of the Six Nations in the defense of Pennsylvania. Conrad W eiser reported to
G overnor Ham ilton that the w estern tributaries had developed a sense o f their
ow n strength and w ere eager to throw off the control o f the Six Nations.
"Betwixt them two separate Interests," Ham ilton w rote to Thomas Penn, "it is
really difficult to know how to act without offending one o f th em ." The
proprietary governm ent chose the existing alliance w ith the Iroquois.

"The rise

and fall of the two Interests m ust therefore be carefully attended to," H am ilton
concluded, "but at present I think it safest to treat through the Council at

121 CR 6:149, 159; Jennings, Empire of Fortune. 75; Jennings, "M iquon’s
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O nondago."122 By the time the governm ent responded to the m essages W eiser
carried from Aughwick, the office o f governor had changed hands.
Robert H unter M orris probably had little experience with the symbolic
protocol and m etaphorical speech o f Indian diplomacy. As governor he
assum ed the title o f "Brother Onas," the name that Pennsylvania’s Indians had
bestowed upon W illiam Penn and continued to call his successors.123 Conrad
W eiser w rote the draft o f M orris’s first message to Aughw ick and as provincial
interpreter probably shaped many others to conform to Delaware and Iroquois
parlance.124 In the realm o f provincial politics, M orris was a tireless and
provocative speaker and w riter. His contentious messages to the Assembly
w ere long-winded and meticulously argued. W hen attacked by the Assem bly,
M orris allowed not even the slightest perceived affront to go unansw ered.125
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Consequently, he had little patience with the far m ore restrained m anner o f
Indian diplomatic ritual.

’’The Indians adhere so closely to their Tedious

Cerm onies," M orris once wrote to W illiam Johnson, "that I am sensible you
m ust have had a m ost fatiguing time of it." 126 Colonial authorities had long
resigned themselves to the Indian m anner o f diplomatic discourse, but their
intentions and sense of superiority were never comprom ised.

"The hearty

handshakes, the friendly words, and the piles of presents," James H. M errell
observed, "concealed contempt and a manipulative, even exploitative
instinct."127 M orris’s correspondence and meetings with the Indians, especially
the tributary tribes, exemplified M errell’s generalization.
G overnor M orris had been in Philadelphia for nearly two m onths when
he m ade his official presence known to the Aughwick Indians. The French
w ere gaining support among the western Iroquois. A "great m any" Iroquois
had gone to Canada with neither "fear nor regard" o f the pro-English
comm issioners who had tried to stop them. Daniel Claus reported that it would

that did not the duties of m y Station and Justice to the people require m e to take
some notice of it, I should think it beneath me as a Gentlem an to m ake any
reply." After a withering item-by-item refutation o f the A ssem bly’s rem arks, he
told them that over the last "fifteen years" they were guilty o f "more artifice,
m ore time and money spent in frivolous controversies, m ore unparallelled
abuses o f your Governors, and m ore undutifullness to the Crow n, than in all
the rest o f his M ajestie’s Colonies put together." M orris to Assembly,
Septem ber 24, 1755, CR 6:617-23.
126 M orris to W illiam Johnson, April 24, 1756, Papers of Sir W illiam Johnson.
II, 439.
127 M errell, The Indians’ New W orld. 150.
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take a very long letter to document "all the false and unjust stories the French
spread among the Six Nations about W ashington’s defeat." Claus argued that
only an English show o f strength could counter the effects of French
propaganda among the Indians.128
W ith neither a m ilitia at his disposal nor the prospect o f m ilitary
expenditures from the Assembly, M orris could offer little m ore than w ords to
the Indians at Aughwick. In his letter, M orris addressed the Iroquois
supervisors to whom he made the virtually meaningless pronouncem ent that
they w ere now under the "protection" o f Pennsylvania. The Indians w ere told
that the king o f England had been moved to action "upon hearing o f the
invasion o f the French on your lands." After exhausting "all fair means" the
king had resolved to drive the French from the Ohio, protect the Indians, and
"more too if they desire it of him in a suitable w ay." After making these
grandiose prom ises, M orris told the Indians that the British cam paign against
the French was likely to be directed by the governor o f M aryland and that they
had best wait to hear "the particulars" from h im .129
The Indians ignored M orris’s disclaimer.

"The Ohio Indians in

G inrele," Croghan scrawled back to the governor, "putts thire hole Dependence
on [Pennsylvania’s] governm ent in Regarde to ye Expedition." The Indians

128 Claus to "the late G overnor," October 1754, CR 6:181-82.
129 M orris to the Indians at Aughwick, Novem ber 15, 1754, PA , 1st ser.,
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would go to w ar only in concert with the English and they expected to be
supported until such time as their white allies decided to fight. M oreover, if
M orris and the Assembly could not quickly provide the Indians w ith ample food
and clothing, Croghan thought it better to "give them up without any further
E xpence."130 The Assembly complained of the cost, but nonetheless kept
Aughw ick supplied with provisions through the w inter.131
M orris again consulted Conrad W eiser before sending a m essage o f
greeting to the the Ohio and Susquehanna Delawares. In July 1754, a
proprietary delegation aided by W eiser had persuaded the Iroquois at Albany to
sell a huge tract o f land extending from the Alleghanies to the Ohio. The
Albany purchase was a final blow to the prestige o f the Delawares and they
greeted W eiser’s report o f the sale with disgust.132 The Six Nations had
reserved the towns of W yoming and Shamokin "and the land contiguous on
Susquehannah" for those Indians who chose to "remove from the F re n ch ."133
Careful neither to tread on Iroquois authority nor to agitate the D elaw ares, the
governor spoke o f the situation in the west in pleasant generalities. He invoked
the m em ory o f W illiam Penn as he reconfirm ed the longstanding "Treaty of
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Friendship" with the Delawares. He genially glossed over three decades of
proprietary exploitation and white encroachm ent w hen he insisted that
Pennsylvania’s whites and the Delawares were one people "notwithstanding you
now live at a great distance from us." M orris also m ade a patronizing attem pt
to am eliorate the Albany purchase.

"We look upon the place you now live," he

told the Delawares, "as a place of Sport and good Hunting; this never makes
any odds betw een B retheren."134 M orris had obviously noted that the Iroquois
had reserved land for their own hunting in the Albany deed. The Indians
hardly intended the territory for "sport."
M ost English colonists interpreted the Indian m ale’s proclivity for
hunting as evidence of an idle and frivolous nature. The English looked
askance at the Indian division o f labor which made agriculture the exclusive
province o f women. Despite its importance to Indian life, the English could not
accept the idea o f hunting as "real w o rk ."135 In essence, M orris was telling the
D elawares that as long as Pennsylvania’s governm ent left them with their
diversions and the bare means o f survival, the Indians need not w orry over the
loss o f their land. M orris came to rely heavily on Scarroyady, an Oneida
sachem, as his chief operative among the tributary tribes. The governor
praised Scarroyady as "a M an who is so sensible that the Cause o f the Indians
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and the English is one and the sam e."136 Scarroyady was comm itted to
maintaining the Pennsylvania-Iroquois alliance which was crucial to the Six
N ations’ (as well as his own) preem inence over the Delawares and Shaw nees.137
His position at Onondaga had no doubt declined after his flight from the Ohio.
He now sought to preserve his place in Indian affairs at the opposite end o f the
covenant chain in Philadelphia.
Scarroyady displayed both an unsettling candor as well as a high degree
o f loyalty in his service to the proprietary leaders. At a conference in late
M arch 1755, he concluded his "publick Business" w ith the governor and
council and then offered them some advice.

"You think You perfectly well

understand the M anagem ent o f Indian Affairs," he told them , "but I m ust tell
you that it is not so, and that the French are m ore politick than you."
Scarroyady then criticized the Pennsylvania governm ent for being less generous
than the French in issuing presents and warned of the consequences.138 The
outnum bered French recognized that their success on the Ohio depended upon
Indian support. A unified Indian policy further strengthened the French
presence, by contrast to English N orth Am erica where each colony supervised
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its ow n Indian affairs.139
M orris displayed little regard for the Susquehanna D elaw ares, the
Indians closest to Pennsylvania’s frontier settlements. He presum ed rather than
cultivated the allegiance of the Susquehanna tributary tribes. In A pril 1755,
less than three months before Braddock’s defeat, Teedyuscung and Paxinosa,
chiefs respectively o f the Susquehanna Delawares and Shawnees, visited
Philadelphia along with a representation o f neighboring Indians. Ostensibly,
the Indians came to renew the chain of friendship. H ow ever, the Susquehanna
Indians w ere suffering from a shortage o f food and the anxiety brought on by
conflicting French and English rhetoric. A n unseasonable frost follow ed by
drought had badly damaged the Indians’ corn c ro p .140 Paxinosa had begun to
lim it the distance that his hunters could range from their W yom ing Valley
hom es "so that upon any Occassion the Indians may soon be called to g eth er."141
C om pounding the uneasiness for the Susquehanna Indians this spring w ere the
unwelcom e arrivals at Shamokin o f Indians who boasted o f contact w ith the

139 Donald H. Kent, The French Invasion o f W estern Pennsylvania. 1753
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Jennings, Em pire of Fortune. 188; Root, The Relations o f Pennsylvania w ith
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140 W eslager, The Delaware Indians. 227; W eiser to Peters, M ay 19, 1755, PA,
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141 Exam ination o f John Schmick and Henry Frey, N ovem ber 1755, Tim othy
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F ren ch .142 The Susquehanna Delawares no doubt expected gifts from the
governor, but m ore important, their presence constituted a reconnaissance
designed to get at the heart o f the governm ent’s intentions.
O n the second day of the conference, Teedyuscung produced a pipe and
"some o f the same good Tobacco that your and Our Uncles G randfathers used
to smoke together."143 To the Delawares and other Indian groups, smoking
tobacco before form al discourse symbolically prepared the way for open
com m unication and mutual understanding.144 Teedyuscung acknowledged the
D elaw ares’ status as "women" at the center of the covenant chain betw een the
Six Nations and Pennsylvania. At the same time, the Delaware chief revealed a
sense o f uncertainty over the future of the covenant chain. He spoke o f a time
w hen the "children" o f the Delawares would come into the w orld and "see the
Sun and Sky clear and the road open betw een Us and You." Teedyuscung
hinted that the new generation o f Delawares were free to appraise their
subordinate position. The Delaware chief stated that he would "advise" (rather
than order) his people "to take and always continue to hold the m iddle o f that
C h ain ."145
Teedyuscung spoke of the Six Nations, Pennsylvania, and the D elaw ares,
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respectively as "Two Sons and one D aughter," and emphasized that "they are
all one F am ily."146 The Delawares w ere prohibited from m aking w ar. In their
role as peace-keeping "w om en," the Delawares expected that in times o f unrest
"the other nations who make war" would protect them .147 The Susquehanna
D elawares w ere dutifully playing their role by deferring to the two pow ers that
held the ends o f the covenant chain. It was incum bent upon Pennsylvania and
the Iroquois to take action now that the Delawares found themselves in an
increasingly untenable situation.
W hen the Delawares had left for the day, Scarroyady rem inded the
council m em bers that Teedyuscung’s gesture was intended "to induce Us to
return them a Pipe of T obacco." The Oneida chief suggested that the
councilors simply im part a strong message regarding the importance of
D elaware loyalty to the Six Nations along with the requisite tobacco.
Scarrroyady intended to draw the Delawares aside with his own "Pipe of
Tobacco to sm oak & ...to give them the same good A dvice."148 W hat the
Delawares needed m ore than this often-repeated message was tangible evidence
that m aintaining their passive position within the covenant chain would not
result in their destruction.
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G overnor M orris, who had just returned from a council o f w ar at
A lexandria, inform ed the Indians of the upcoming expeditions against the
French. In addition to Braddock’s m ission against Fort Duquesne, W illiam
Johnson was to lead a force against Crow n Point. Johnson had also been
comm issioned to supervise British Indian affairs and to secure the Iroquois "and
their Allies" to the British interest.149 M orris presented the Indians with a belt
o f wam pum from Johnson. The governor repeated Johnson’s request that the
Delawares "not depart from [their] Habitations but w ait for a m essage" from
Onondaga following a conference betweeen the new superintendant and the
Iroquois.150 The Susquehanna Indians prepared to return to their hom es, having
learned nothing that prom ised an immediate end to their predicam ent. M orris
saw the Indian conference as routine.

"The Susquehannah Indians expect a

p resen t," he blithely inform ed the Assembly, "which need not be great as they
have no Particular Business and only come down to assure Us o f the
Continuance of their F riendship."151
W hen a contingent o f W yandots appeared in Philadelphia one m onth
after B raddock’s defeat, M orris was far more willing to attend to the needs of
the tributary tribes. He took the occasion o f the W yandots’ visit to offer the
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Assembly a m ore serious assessment of the state o f Indian affairs. The
governor suggested that those Indians who could "be m ade hearty for us" m ight
"prevent a Great Deal o f M ischief, engage other Indians in our Favour, and be
prepared for any other Service we may think proper to employ them in ."
Securing their allegiance would require his own best efforts as well as the
always reluctant financial assistance of the Assembly.

"To do this," M orris

now realized, "will require great Skill and an open Hand, for Presents they
certainly expect, and will not at this Time be satisfied w ith small O n es."152
M orris knew that the impression his governorship m ade in London
would be due in part to his handling o f Pennsylvania’s Indians and he was
eager to enhance his own political future in the British colonial adm inistration.
He attem pted to accommodate both imperial and proprietary interests in his
m anagem ent o f Indian affairs as well as in his ongoing battle with the Assembly
over m ilitary appropriations. As M orris had prepared to leave London for
Philadelphia, he suggested to Thomas Penn that the time m ight be right "to
press the governm ent to sett apart some annuall small sum for the defence of
the British Em pire in Am erica to be applied to keeping the Indians in our
In terest." In the same breath M orris deferentially added that the proprietor
would be "best judge" of the m atter.153
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James H. H utson’s analysis of M orris’s first attempt to secure m ilitary
funds from the Assembly provides an example of the governor’s com plicated
agenda. The Assembly proposed a bill to support Braddock’s expedition that
would have violated Thomas Penn’s instruction regarding paper money. The
appropriation was to be sunk over ten years and would have provided the
Assembly with an annual surplus o f two thousand pounds. Follow ing G overnor
H am ilton’s precedent, M orris blocked the bill’s passage by insisting that it
include a suspending clause. He had good reason to believe that his stand
would m ake a favorable im pression in London. Although the suspending clause
was regarded as obsolete by the Assembly, the presidents o f the Privy Council
and the Board o f Trade believed it to be still in effect. Yet, if M orris w ere to
make any gains on behalf of the proprietary interest, he needed to inspire a
willingness to comprom ise in the Assembly. In a confusing m essage to the
Assem bly, M orris came down on both sides o f the issue. First, he offered to
soften his position on the suspending clause in return for concessions on the
length o f the excise. He then made a long digression on the "inviolability" o f
the suspending clause.

"It almost looked as though M orris w ere trying to hide

his offer o f a compromise from the scrutiny of British officialdom ," H utson
suggested.154
Both the Assembly and Thomas Penn found M orris to be unusually

154 Hutson, "Benjamin Franklin and Pennsylvania Politics," 340.
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preoccupied with his reputation in B ritain.155 In August 1755, the Assembly
accused M orris o f making "plausible speeches" designed to be well received by
those unfam iliar with his daily handling of affairs in Philadelphia.

"Indeed,"

the Assembly continued sarcastically, the governor’s messages appeared "not to
be m ade so m uch for us as for others: to shew the M inistry at home his great
Zeal for his M ajesty’s Service and concern for the W elfare o f his People!"156
M orris did seek the favor of the Newcastle administration. The Duke of
Newcastle had created a powerful bureaucracy while serving as secretary o f
state for the southern department. The Newcastle adm inistration’s influence
was based on the extensive distribution o f colonial patronage and strong
advocacy o f the royal prerogative in the colonies.157 M orris’s dogged efforts on
behalf o f New Jersey’s proprietors had ultimately w on him the governorship of
Pennsylvania. He now held a highly visible position from which to display his
talents to London. However, M orris could neither afford to comprom ise
Thomas P enn’s instructions nor the proprietor’s political goal o f limiting the
pow er o f the Assembly. M orris had cited imperial considerations to Secretary
o f State Thomas Robinson as his reason for vetoing the A ssem bly’s supply bill.
Penn was quick to rebuke his lieutenant governor.

"I think you had better have

avoided giving some o f the reasons you did for not passing the Bills," Penn
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advised M orris, "as those Reasons were m ore propper for a G overnor in a
K ing’s G overnm ent."158 Until M orris’s position in London was secure, his
political future lay largely in the hands of Thomas Penn.
In his first official speech to the Assembly, M orris had declared that the
French presence on the Ohio had "turned the Eyes o f Europe" upon
Pennsylvania and w arned that the "Conduct o f these Colonies will be m ore than
ever the Object o f their attention, and ours in particular, who are m ost
immediately concerned."159 In August 1754, Lord Halifax, the president o f the
Board o f Trade, had presented the crow n with a plan to centralize the
adm inistration o f colonial Indian affairs. Halifax understood the impact that a
strong British alliance with the Six Nations could have in a N orth Am erican
w ar against France. The handling o f Indian affairs by the individual colonies
would never secure O nondaga’s full cooperation.160 Halifax had neither time
nor patience to deal with colonies that might resist surrendering control over
their ow n Indian affairs. He informed the king that the need for a single
authority in Indian affairs was "so apparent, that we hope no difficulty will
occur on their p a rt." 161 U nder H alifax’s plan, a superintendent was to be
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appointed. Each colony was responsible for building forts and "establishing &
subsisting such Com missarys in such Forts as shall appear to be necesssary for
the m anagem ent o f Indian services."162 Halifax intended to take strong
m easures against provincial governm ents that failed to cooperate.

"We see no

other m ethod that can be tak en ," he argued, "but that o f an application for an
interposition o f the Authority o f P arliam ent."163
Thomas Penn was as comm itted to protecting the proprietary interest
from the interference o f the royal governm ent as he was from the Assembly.
C onsequently, Penn exercised "great caution" in his dealings w ith L ord Halifax.
In 1753, Penn warned his provincial secretary, Richard Peters, to be equally
circum spect in his reports to Halifax. Penn w orried that the Board o f Trade
m ight becom e overly concerned by the deep antagonisms that divided
Pennsylvania’s government. Indiscretion on the part o f proprietary officials
m ight bring about "disagreeable consequences" in the form o f unwanted
"assistance" from London. Penn later urged M orris to use sim ilar caution.
The proprietor feared that once Parliam ent stepped in, "they m ay go further
than either the Government or the Colonys wish they w o u ld ."164 N ear the end
o f M o rris’s first year in office, Penn declared him self pleased w ith his
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lieutenant governor’s "disinclination to write to the Board of T rade." In P enn’s
view , M o rris’s chief responsibility was to advance the proprietary interest in
Pennsylvania. Penn preferred to handle alone the m ore subtle task o f keeping
im perial officials at bay while presenting them with the image o f a wellgoverned and loyal province.

"We ought to shew our selves to serve the

publick as any Kings G overnor," Penn explained to Richard Peters, "but should
not too easily submit to all the orders they are pleased to send th em ."165
In N ovem ber 1754, Lord Halifax ordered M orris to cooperate w ith
General Edw ard Braddock "in everything he shall think necessary for His
M ajesty’s S ervice."166 M orris then began to organize Indian support for
B raddock’s expedition. Secretary Peters recom mended that M orris enlist
George C roghan’s assistance in Indian m atters. Peters had sim ultaneously
hinted to Croghan that the Assembly m ight be persuaded to relieve him o f his
financial debts in return for his service among the Indians.167
C roghan wanted to salvage his reputation in Pennsylvania. After
achieving spectacular success in the Indian trade, Croghan had lost m uch o f his
fortune. He was now heavily in debt and lived at Aughwick to avoid arrest and
legal proceedings initiated by his Philadelphia creditors. C roghan was largely
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responsible for Pennsylvania’s profitable contact with the Ohio Indians. In
1751, Croghan had attempted to protect his own trade interests by telling the
Assembly that the Ohio Indians wanted the province to establish a fort to guard
against French encroachment. The subsequent testimony o f the Indian
interpreter A ndrew M ontour showed that Croghan had lied. Croghan fell into
disrepute with Philadelphia’s Quaker elite.168 H ow ever, the Ohio Indians had
now been left vulnerable to French overtures, and imperial authorities w ere
increasingly impatient with the provincial handling o f Indian affairs. The
proprietary leaders could not afford to ignore George C roghan’s influence and
his unique vantage point on the rapidly changing conditions on the frontier.
Conrad W eiser’s August and September accounts o f the situation at
Aughwick w ere already out o f date. W ith only a week rem aining before the
Assembly was due to m eet on Decem ber third, M orris contacted Croghan. The
governor wanted first-hand information on the "sentiments, Inclinations,
resolutions & expectations of the Indians" to present to the legislature. M orris
also noted that fresh intelligence was "absolutely necessary for his M ajesty’s
service and the Interest o f these Colonys." M aking the m ost of C roghan’s
vulnerable situation, the governor placed his new operative under extreme
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pressure.

"If you should fail in this," M orris warned, "the proper m easures for

his Majestys service may be retarded and the Indians disappointed."169 Other
than underscoring the Indians’ anticipation o f food and clothing from
Philadelphia, Croghan could only report the widespread fear o f "French
Indians" among the Aughwick refugees.

"This is all I know o f thire Sentiments

att present," he concluded.170
Thomas Penn’s instructions also required M orris to prom ote the
settlem ent o f the newly-purchased prorietary land betw een the Alleghany
M ountains and the Ohio. By October 1754, Penn acknowledged that French
control of the Ohio tem porarily precluded any attempt to settle the region.
From London, Penn wrote M orris that "I would not put any People upon such
an undertaking til there is a probability o f securing our possession." How ever,
Penn confidently reported that "We are preparing here to do i t ." His plan for
the settlement o f the Ohio land rested on the news that a m ilitary expedition
against the French was being readied in Ireland under General Edw ard
B raddock.171 Penn clearly hoped to benefit from this advantageous union o f
proprietary economic interest and B ritain’s m ilitary strategy in N orth Am erica.
If M orris had any misgivings over Penn’s aggressive pursuit o f Indian
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land in the face of the volatile situation in the west, he kept his ow n counsel. It
took B raddock’s defeat and the Delaware uprising to incite P enn’s adversaries
in the Assembly to probe the nature of Pennsylvania’s Indian land acquisitions.
W hen the Assembly suggested that the Indians’ dissatisfaction w ith land
purchases m ight explain the frontier attacks, M orris steadfastly defended the
proprietary interest. Through the rem ainder of his governorship and even after
he left office, M orris insisted that Pennsylvania had practiced a consistent
policy o f "just and favourable treatm ent o f the Indians." He argued that the
Delawares had been emboldened by the French and "induced" to attack by "the
w eak and defenseless state o f the English frontiers" and the A ssem bly’s
"Pacifist Influence."172
As the Delaware w ar effort gained m omentum in late 1755, M orris
received a report concerning the cause o f the Indian attacks. He passed on the
inform ation to General W illiam Shirley, the comm ander o f British forces in
N orth Am erica, but he would not reveal the source in w riting.173 M orris had
learned that the Delaware leaders w ere telling their people that the w ar had
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been initiated "to Recover their Lands, & Reduce both the English & F rench to
N arrow er Bounds." The governor called the rationale "M eer Pretense" and
declared that "those Indians are intirely under the D irection o f the F re n c h ." He
added bitterly that the French had employed a "good Policy, as they can no
way M ake w ar so Cheap as by employing Body’s o f Indians."174
If M orris could not conceive that the Delawares would act independently
in defense o f their lands; he held no such illusions about their Iroquois
superiors. M orris saw a very real correlation betw een questionable land
purchases and Indian violence when the prospective buyers were whites from
outside the colony and the Indian land lay within Pennsylvania’s boundaries. In
July 1754, the Pennsylvania commissioners at the Albany Conference first
encountered the Connecticut-based Susquehanna Company. John Henry
Lydius, an Indian trader headquartered in Albany, was now the com pany’s
agent and had approached several Iroquois leaders. Lydius hoped to convince
them to sell the Delaware and Shawnee homeland between the two great forks
o f the Susquehanna River. The Susquehanna Company claimed that the land
was situated "within the Latitude of the Connecticut C h arter."175 The
Pennsylvania comm issioners protested to the Iroquois that the land in question
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lay "in the Centre o f their Province." They rem inded the sachems that by
treaty in 1737, the Six Nations had agreed to sell "no Lands within the Bounds
o f ye Pennsylvania C harter to any but the Proprietaries o f Pennsylvania."176
H endrick Peters, a M ohawk sachem, told the proprietary comm issioners that
there was no need to quarrel with the Connecticut m en over the Susquehanna
land.

"We will not part with it to either o f you," H endrick stated flatly, "We

will reserve it for our W estern Indians to live o n ."177 H ow ever, H endrick did
not speak for all the leaders o f the Six Nations. By the end o f 1754, Lydius
had already secured the signatures o f several prom inent Iroquois to the deed
and was working to obtain m o re.178
In Decem ber, M orris informed Thomas Penn that "The Connecticut
affair, nothwithstanding what Pass’d at Albany, has taken a very bad turn, and
a Purchase is actually m ad e."179 In Novem ber, M orris had placed
Pennsylvania’s case before W illiam Johnson and asked him to help arrange a
m eeting with H endrick in Philadelphia. Based on H endrick’s assurances at
Albany and his apparently friendly disposition toward Pennsylvnia, M orris
intended to use the M ohawk sachem to press the proprietary cause at
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Onondaga.180
The foundation o f M orris’s opposition to the Susquehanna Com pany
rested on legal grounds. He could not see how the Iroquois leadership could
justify the sale.

"W henever the Six Nations shall in their publick Council

consider this Deed made by Lydius," M orris confidently told W illiam Johnson,
"they will deem it a Violation o f publick Faith and an arrant piece o f F ra u d ." 181
M orris held that "By the Laws o f England and o f this Country No M an
whatsoever" had the authority to initiate private negotiations or land sales with
the Indians "without a Lycence first Obtained from the Governm ent in which
such Land lyes." According to M orris, not only w ere unsanctioned land
purchases void "but the person m aking the purchase is highly C rim inal, and so
are all those that pretend to hold Lands under it." 182
Some Pennsylvanians, M orris noted angrily, were eager to take up land
in the Susquehanna region along with the Connecticut settlers. M orris could
not resist an opportunity to accuse his political enemies in New Jersey o f
exacerbating the situation. The governor informed Thomas Penn that the
Pennsylvania settlers intended to hold the land "by force as the Jersey m en do."
W ere it not for the "effect that the Impunity o f the Jersey Rioters has upon the
People here," M orris complained, "this affair may Possibly Blow over."
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M orris quietly conceded to Penn that the solution lay in persuading the Six
Nations to negate the purchase.183
Legality aside, when it came to the politics o f approaching the divided
council o f the Six Nations, the governor was less sanguine and m ore
calculating. M orris asked for W illiam Johnson’s cooperation in keeping
H endrick ignorant of the specific reason he was being summoned to
Philadelphia.

"Indians do not like to blame one another," M orris explained,

"and should he be told beforehand that this is the Business he is sent for he may
decline in com ing."184 M orris apparently thought that H endrick would be m ore
receptive while enjoying the governor’s hospitality far from the influence o f the
Six Nations. H endrick was told only that the governor wished to consult w ith
him "on some Affairs in which the safety o f the Indians and his M ajesties
Colonies are very m uch concerned." M orris flattered the M ohawk chief by
declaring that, as the new governor, he could not speak "to the Council o f the
Six Nations till I know your M in d ."185
W illiam Johnson informed M orris that he had spoken to H endrick
"concerning the affair as far as I judged necessary." Johnson emphasized
H endrick’s disapproval of the Susquehanna deed and assured M orris that the
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chief had prom ised to work on Pennsylvania’s behalf.186 To provincial
secretary Richard Peters, Johnson provided a m ore telling assessment o f the
divisions w ithin the Six Nations. Johnson informed the secretary that initially
H endrick had refused to go to Philadelphia. Johnson was able to allay
H endrick’s "Fears and Uneasiness" only after extensive discussions and
"promising to jo in and back him here among the Six N ations."187
After approaching Hendrick, M orris turned his attention to Connecticut
Governor Thomas Fitch. M orris lectured his Connecticut counterpart w ith a
self-serving history o f Pennsylvania’s Indian treaties and land claims. M orris
made no m ention of the Iroquois appropriation of Delaware land rights and the
ensuing Pennsylvania-Six Nations alliance that had facilitated the colony’s land
acquisitions. He made only a fleeting reference to the presence o f the
Delawares and other tributaries. M orris insisted that the "Six United Nations
o f Indians and their Allies the Susquehannahs" had several times "publicly
acknowledged, ratified, and confirmed" the provincial boundaries claim ed by
Pennsylvania. The Susquehanna Company, on the other hand, had em barked
on a "wild Scheme" that threatened to "bring on an Indian W ar in the Bowels
o f this P rovince."188
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G overnor M orris had ju st received a wam pum belt and message from
John Shickelamy, an Oneida chief and his late father’s successor as Iroquois
supervisor at Shamokin. Shickelamy reported that the Connecticut settlers had
begun arriving in the region.

"I desire you to send to these people not to

c o m e,” he said, "and if you do not prevent it I shall be oblig’d to com plain to
the Six N ations."189 Shickelamy was acting in strict accordance with the
directives he had been given by the Six Nations.
Just before H endrick signed the Albany deed in July, he had placed a
condition on the sale. Shickelamy would notify Philadelphia o f any white
incursion into the Suquahanna reserve. The proprietaries would then become
responsible for rem oving all white settlers regardless o f whether they were
Pennsylvanians "or from other Provinces." If the governm ent w ere to "fail in
this Application," H endrick warned, "We will come ourselves and turn them
o ff." H endrick had imposed what amounted to a m ilitary obligation on the
Pennsylvania comm issioners. He firmly reminded the Pennsylvanians a second
tim e that the Susquehanna territory would rem ain Indian land and then told
them to go and "Get your Deed ready as fast as You c a n ."190
M orris w orked feverishly to prevent the collision o f the Iroquois and the
Connecticut settlers on the Susquehanna. He summoned Scarroyady for a b rief
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m eeting and then dispatched the Oneida leader to Onondaga w ith orders to
"Enquire into this Affair and set it right." M orris could hardly contain his
frustration. Proprietary land hunger had placed his governm ent into an
unw anted role in an internal Iroquois affair.

"Tell them ," he ordered

Scarroyady, "it is their doing not ours, if John Shickalamy is disturbed." The
governor fretted over the implications that the Susquehanna problem carried for
the Pennsylvania-Six Nations alliance and the colony’s obligation to B ritain’s
struggle with the French. W ithin the space o f a single sentence, M orris
w aivered betw een support and non-involvement regarding the Iroquois defense
o f the Susquehanna lands. He lamented that both Pennsylvania and the Six
Nations would be "put to the Trouble o f driving away these People if they
com e." But w hen he expressed his fear o f w ar to Scarroyady, he defined it as
a potential conflict betw een "your People and these Strangers." (M orris did not
share w ith Scarroyady his belief that many o f the intruders m ight be
Pennsylvanians). The governor concluded by emphasizing that hostilities on the
Susquehanna would "hinder" the Six Nations and Pennsylvania "from fighting
the F re n ch ."191
Scarroyady’s reply to M orris m irrored the governor’s view o f the
Susquehanna Com pany’s design. The Oneida chief described Lydius as a "Vile
M a n ," who had thus far succeeded through deceit and ample bribes o f money

191 M o rris’s instructions to Scarroyady, Decem ber 24, 1754, CR 6:217.
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and liquor. Scarroyady declared that once the issue was presented in its true
light at Onondaga, the Six Nations Council would cancel the d eed .192
In early January 1755, H endrick arrived in Philadelphia w ith an
entourage o f M ohawks. H endrick agreed with M orris and his advisors that the
Susquehanna purchase was a "false Proceeding," but could offer no guarantees
that the sale could be easily overturned. He recom mended that Pennsylvania
send a delegation to each of the Six Nations to review the deed. The only
perm anent solution was to compel the Six Nations and the Connecticut
governm ent to "cancel the Deed in a T reaty ."193
To involve the Connecticut governm ent in the process would establish a
dangerous precedent. The proprietary leadership resolved to undercut the
Susquehanna deed rather than confront it as a legitimate document. Richard
Peters argued that Pennsylvania required a deed from the Six Nations for the
entire extent o f the colony’s grant.

"Unless this be done," he told W illiam

Johnson, "it will always be in the pow er o f such m en as Lydius to disturb the
Peace o f the Governm ent and to breed endless distractions."194
Thomas Penn disagreed with P eters’ proposal. The proprietor
com plim ented M orris on his overall handling of the Susquehanna affair, but
favored a m ore aggressive approach toward the Six Nations. Penn balked at

192 Ib id.
193 H endrick to the Council, January 5, 1755, CR 6:278.
194 Peters to Johnson, January 23, 1755, CR 6:288-89.
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"making a purchase o f these worthless Indians, til they have dem anded the
Deed from the people of C onnecticut." He would have preferred M orris to
send Conrad W eiser to Onondaga than to bring H endrick to Philadelphia. Once
the Six Nations w ere compelled to destroy the Susquehanna deed, Penn
recom m ended that Pennsylvania make an overall purchase. H ow ever, Penn
advocated paying the Iroquois in kind "to the value o f two or three hundred
pounds Currency every three years fo rev er." The proprietor argued that the
extended payments would place the Six Nations "in a kind o f dependence on
us" that would w ard off the influence o f the F ren ch .195 Penn overestim ated
Pennsylvania’s ability to dictate such strong terms at Onondaga. W hile in
Philadelphia, H endrick had informed M orris and the provincial council that a
m ajority of the Six Nations now sided with the French.

"You are w eak," the

sachem told the Pennsylvanians, "You build no strong Houses, You send
Persons only to trade amongst Us who consult their ow n Interest and often
impose on U s ." 196
By June, M orris could offer Shickalamy only a tem porary and largely
symbolic response to his complaint. M orris intended to send a team of
surveyors to determ ine the exact boundary betw een the Albany purchase and
the Susquehanna reserve. The governor would then issue a proclam ation

195 Penn to M orris, July 2, 1755, PA, 1st ser., 2:370-71.
196 H endrick to the Council at Philadelphia, January 15, 1755, CR 6:280.
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forbidding settlement w ithin the Iroquois claim.

"If after this any shall presum e

to settle," he concluded lamely, "they will be punished."197 One m onth later,
B raddock’s defeat would set the stage for the Delawares to take m atters into
their ow n hands.
In A pril, General Edward Braddock asked M orris to supply the arm y
with an escort com prised o f "Indians in your Province that form erly liv’d near
the River O hio."198 M orris immediately wrote to C roghan at Aughw ick and
ordered him to organize as m any Indians as possible to jo in Braddock’s
expedition. Croghan was to tell the "Six Nations, D elawares, Shawonese,
Twightwees, and Owendats" o f the Ohio that they would be aiding the king’s
efforts to reclaim the Ohio from the French and return it to the Indians. M orris
enclosed a copy o f Braddock’s official request, but added a pointed rem inder of
his own.

"You are sensible," M orris wrote "that the larger the N um ber the

m ore credit it will be to this province."199 But the Albany purchase was still
fresh in the minds o f the Delawares and Shawnees. For the time being, M orris
left it to Croghan to explain to the Indians at Aughwick the glaring
inconsistency betw een the stated intentions o f king and proprietor regarding
their land.
O n May 1, C roghan reported back that he had sum m oned the Delawares

197 M orris to Shickalamy, June 1755, CR 6:420.
198 Braddock to M orris, April 15, 1755, P A , 1st ser., 2:290.
199 M orris to Croghan, April 23, 1755, CR 6:372.
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and Shawnees "such as can be found on this side the French fort." He had also
sent w ord to the Susquehanna Indians.200 Three weeks later both Braddock and
C roghan related that approxim ately fifty Indians had joined the expedition and
that the m essengers had not yet returned from the Susquehanna. Braddock
explained that he was sending the w om en and children back into the province
and inform ed M orris that he had prom ised the Indians that the governor "would
take Particular care of ’em. "201
Richard Peters, who had just returned from Aughwick, painted a
troubling picture o f Braddock’s encampment. Braddock had in fact ordered the
Indian wom en out o f the camp because o f ram pant "prostitution." The British
officers w ere "scandalously fond" o f the "Squas," who turned their earnings
over to the Indian men. M ore disturbing was Peters’ report that Braddock had
refused to consult with the Indians and the latter were highly resentful.

"High

quarrels" had taken place betw een the general and the Indians.202 In
Philadelphia, one m onth after the decisive battle, the Seneca chief Kanuksusy
vented his anger at the treatm ent he had received from Braddock.

"He is now

dead," the chief said, "but he was a bad m an when he was alive; he looked
upon us as dogs and would never hear anything we said to him ." Kanuksusy

200 C roghan to M orris, M ay 1, 1755, CR 6:374-75.
201 Braddock to M orris, M ay 20, 1755, CR 6:398; Croghan to M orris, Ibid . .
399.
202 Peters to the Council, June 2, 1755, CR 6:397.
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w ent on to relate that Braddock’s contempt for the Indians had driven m ost o f
the w arriors to leave the expedition.203
B raddock’s refusal to treat the Indians as full allies was only part o f the
reason they abandoned him. Shingas, a Delaware chief and one o f the leaders
o f the D elaw are uprising in the west, had been at Braddock’s camp. In
N ovem ber 1755, Shingas related his experiences with Braddock to Charles
Stuart, a prisoner of the Delawares. In two separate discussions w ith several
Ohio chiefs, Braddock had confirm ed the Indians’ w orst suspicions. The
general bluntly told the Indians that "No Savage Should Inherit the Land" once
the French had been defeated. The Indians protested that if that w ere the case,
they would not fight with the British. In a m oment o f suprem e arrogance,
Braddock bid them leave, telling them that "he did not need their H elp."204
From the time he heard P eters’ Aughwick account, M orris wrote at least
seven letters to Braddock before the general was killed in battle. N ot once did
the governor raise the subject o f the Indians’ reported dissatisfaction or the
conditions at the camp. Indeed, M orris made no reference or inquiry o f any
sort regarding the Indian allies in these final letters.205 M orris was well aware
that procuring a large Indian escort for a successful cam paign would benefit his

203 Kanuksusy to the Council, August 22, 1755, CR 6:589.
204 Quoted in Jennings, Em pire o f Fortune. 154-55.
205 See the letters o f M orris to Braddock, CR 6: 407,408,415,429,461,476 and
P A , 1st ser., 2:373.
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reputation. Having a victorious British general speak o f him in London as a
m eddler who was overly concerned with the welfare o f Indians would do him
little good. General Braddock probably would have regarded M orris’s advice
on Indian diplom acy as civilian interference with his command. As soon as he
arrived in V irginia, Braddock indicated that he was not a m an to be trifled
with. Braddock warned M orris that he would "have Regard to the different
Behaviour o f the several colonies." W hat the general could not obtain
voluntarily from the colonies, he was ready to "repair by unpleasant
M ethods."206 M orris played the sycophant in his correspondence with
Braddock. He professed that he was "sorry" and "ashamed" over the initial
reluctance o f the Assembly to provide recruits and supplies. The governor
readily funneled the blame toward the Assembly for all o f Braddock’s
com plaints.207
In London, two months after Braddock’s defeat, Thomas Penn received
w ord o f the disaster. In a letter to M orris, Penn noted that in the accounts o f
the battle he had read, he found no mention "of our Indians w hich you w rote
m e Braddock had engaged to go with him ." Penn was "perplexed" and hoped
to receive "a very particular account o f this affair."208 M orris had already sent
an explanation o f sorts in which he volunteered nothing that could reflect badly

206 Braddock to M orris, February 28, 1755, CR 6:307.
207 M orris to Braddock, M arch 12, 1755, CR 6:336-37.
208 Penn to M orris, Septem ber 19, 1755, PA, 1st ser., 2:419.
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on his lack of attention to the Indian allies. Braddock had underestim ated the
enem y, M orris explained, and eschewed the "Indian m anner o f fighting."
M oreover, M orris expressed his surprise that Colonel Thomas Dunbar would
w ithdraw the arm y in the face o f inferior French and Indian num bers.

"But

that you may form your Judgem ent o f this Affair," M orris w rote, "I send you
all the Letters and Papers that have come to me upon that head. "209
By the late autum n o f 1755, the Delaware uprising had begun in the
west. The Susquehanna Delawares could no longer rem ain neutral. G overnor
M orris had sent Scarroyady on several dangerous missions before and during
the war. The Oneida chief had kept the governor apprised o f the level o f
French influence among the Six Nations. He was one o f a handful o f Indians
who rem ained with Braddock’s force until the disastrous end o f the cam paign.
At M onongahela, Scarroyady was nearly captured and his son was killed.210
The Oneida chief was undaunted. By September 1755, Scarroyady was eager
to take his small Iroquois-led band from Shamokin against the French forts on
the Ohio. He was frustrated by M orris’s evasive responses w hen he pressed
the governor for support.211
In early Novem ber, Scarroyady appeared in Philadelphia and asked to
speak to the Assembly on behalf o f the Susquehanna Indians. In a speech that

209 M orris to Penn, July 31, 1755, CR 6:517.
210 CR 6:456; Boyd, ed. Indian Treaties Printed bv F ranklin, lxix.
211 Scarroyady to M orris, September 11, 1755, CR 6:615-16.
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historian Julian P. Boyd called "the m ost dram atic spectacle that the State
House saw prior to the R evolution," Scarroyady handed Pennsylvania an
ultim atum .212 First, the Oneida chief addressed the governor and council. He
stated that two Ohio Delawares claiming to speak for the French had come to
the Indian town at Big Island. The two Delawares w arned the Susquehanna
Indians to m ove from the river so as not to impede the coming onslaught
against Pennsylvania. The "Indians among the W hite people" who inhabited
the M oravian missions were singled out and threatened with death. The Ohio
Delawares boasted that they would be "followed by a thousand French and
Indians." The Susquehanna Indians w ere offered a "little hatchet" befitting
their status as women. The Delawares were taken aside as a group and
prom ised an abundance o f ammunition once they reached the O hio.213
W hen M orris brought the Assembly before him, Scarroyady did not
m ention the visit of the Ohio Delawares, but spoke only o f the "imm inent
danger." He told the audience that he had given the Susquehanna D elaw ares a
belt "with the Hatchet in it" to which they had tied a belt of their ow n "to make
the Hatchet the Sharper & give it the greater w eight." Scarroyady pitched the
two belts on the table before him.

"I m ust deal plainly with Y ou," he said,

breaking the silence in the crowded cham ber, "and tell you if you will not fight

212 Boyd, ed. Indian Treaties Printed bv Franklin, lxix.
213 Scarroyady to M orris and the Provincial Council, N ovem ber 8, 1755, CR
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with us we will go somewhere else." His Delaware charges would not prove
their loyalty by sacrificing themselves for an ally who refused to act.
Scarroyady then pointedly denied that his people w ere responsible for any o f
the recent killing on the frontier.

"Brethren," he concluded, "I have done for

the present. "214
M orris seized the dram a o f the moment and asked the Assembly to
adjourn to their ow n cham ber and consider a bill for providing defense m oney.
The governor and the Assembly had been deadlocked for months on the issue.
The Assembly proposed to fund the m ilitary expenditures by levying a tax on
all the lands in the province. M orris would not sign the bill because the
Assembly refused to exclude Thomas Penn’s proprietary estates from the
assessm ent.215 The governor was increasingly aware that his continuing
opposition to the legislation was becoming a political liability. Either M orris
could surrender to the Assembly or face "bearing the blam e here and in
England of refusing to contribute any thing towards the defense o f the
Province."216
M orris had begun to alienate even stalwart m em bers o f Pennsylvania’s
proprietary group. In the spring o f 1755, Richard Peters complained bitterly to
Thomas Penn o f M orris’s vitriolic style of governance and his relentless attacks

214 Ibid., 686.
215 M orris to the Assembly, August 6, 1755, CR 6:526.
216 M orris to Penn, July 31, 1755, CR 6:518.
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on the Quaker-dom inated Assembly. Penn had appointed M orris for those very
reasons.

"I m ust certainly think that the m anner in which you w rite o f the

governor,'' Penn replied, ''proceeds from a desire to have public affairs happily
conducted and also from your real regard to us and our G overnor." Penn
allowed that M orris was "too impetuous," but scolded Peters on the grounds
that his "caution may be carryed too far." The proprietor was both insulted and
som ewhat bemused by what he interpreted as Peters’ undue reserve and naivete.
"I shall I think only observe," Penn concluded, "that I w onder you could take
M r. M orris for a calm m an."217
During the final year o f his governorship, M orris struggled w ith the
Assembly over a milita bill which he considered weak and ineffectual. M orris
also resisted an Indian Trade Bill through which the Assembly hoped to
appropriate control over Indian Affairs. His last challenge as governor came at
the Treaty o f Easton where he came face to face with Teedyuscung, the leader
o f the Delaware uprising on the Susquehanna. Exhausted from battling the
Assem bly and attempting to m aintain control of the w ar-torn frontier, M orris
resigned the governorship, probably under pressure, in August 1756.218

217 Penn to Peters, July 3, 1755, Gratz M anuscripts, Case 2, Box 33-a,
Historical Society of Pennsylvania.
218 Thayer, Israel Pem berton. 118.

CONCLUSION

R obert H unter M orris’s governorship m arked the extent o f his
advancem ent in A m erican provincial politics. He ultimately returned to New
Jersey where he continued to serve as chief justice until his death in 1764.219
Villified by his contemporaries as well as later historians, M orris was one of
Pennsylvania’s m ost unpopular colonial leaders. In August 1755, Benjam in
Franklin wrote that M orris was "the rashest and m ost indiscreet G overnor" he
had encountered in provincial politics. Four months later, as w ar engulfed the
frontier, Franklin declared him to be "half a M adman" and w orried that if
M orris was not soon removed from office, Pennsylvania’s governm ent would
becom e "the w orst on the continent. "220 Nearly two centuries later, historian
Theodore Thayer argued that "Governor M orris and the Quaker Assem bly used
the Indian m enace and the m iserable plight o f the frontier as a lever by which
to gain political advantages."221 Francis Jennings condemned the governor’s
attem pt to obscure the Assem bly’s response to the frontier crisis through

219 K rout, "Robert Hunter M orris," 242.
220 Franklin to Peter Collinson, August 27, 1755; Franklin to Richard Partridge,
N ovem ber 27, 1755, Leonard Labaree, ed. The Papers of Beniamin Franklin
(New Haven, 1963), VI, 169, 273.
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1940), 83.
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"skilful lying" to British m ilitary authorities.222
W hile M orris was in England in 1758, Thomas Penn asked his form er
governor to prepare an affadavit concerning the Delaware uprising. Penn
wished "more particularly" to record whether M orris had received any
com plaint from the Indians regarding "Wrongs or Injurys done to them (or
alleged to be done to them) by the Proprietarys or the Governm ent of
Pensilvania in or about any Purchase o f Lands." If the Indians had registered
no such protest, M orris was asked to explain by what other causes the
"Defection o f the Indians" m ight have proceeded. In his response, M orris
carefully followed Penn’s line o f reason and categorically absolved the
Pennsylvania proprietary o f any responsibility for the Indian w ar.223
M orris attempted to characterize the Ohio Indians’ attacks w ithin
Pennsylvania as no m ore than a local m anifestation of a m uch w ider set of
conditions com m on to the entire British frontier. The "intrigues o f the French"
was the forem ost reason for the violence o f the Ohio tribes. Secondly, the
frauds o f unspecified "English traders" were to blame. Finally, the "neglect of
the English governments" in failing to fortify the entire frontier in time created
an opportunity for the Indians to advance unimpeded into Pennsylvania. The
"publick hostilities" o f the Ohio Indians, M orris pointed out, "first began on the

222 Jennings, Em pire o f Fortune. 142.
223 "Affadavit of Robert H unter M orris," 66.
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frontiers o f Virginia and M aryland and [only] after the Defeat o f G eneral
Braddock w ere carried into Pensilvania."224
The Susquehanna Delawares had been compelled to jo in forces against
Pennsylvania by the m ore numerous Ohio tribes. M orris recounted
Scarroyady’s momentous visit to Philadelphia in minute detail and cited the
Iroquois c h ie fs failure to move the Assembly to action as the turning point.
W ithout the aid o f the Assembly, M orris argued "he could not m ake a full and
satisfactory A nsw er to [Scarroyady’s] D em and."225
"Some time after Scarroyady’s speech" M orris recalled hearing that the
Delawares w ere claiming that fraudulent land purchases had driven tham to
w ar. The governor insisted that no such complaint had been m ade during the
many conferences he had attended during the latter part o f his term . Owing to
the absence o f any general protests over ill-gotten land or to any "particular
Instance" o f land fraud, M orris smugly concluded that the charge "so far as it
related to the Proprietarys, or Governm ent o f Pensilvania, was a m ere Pretense,
and without Foundation. "226
The deadlocked governm ent and M orris’s increasingly contentious bouts
w ith the Asembly alienated even the proprietary party in Pennsylvania.
Thomas Penn began to search for a successor to his unpopular governor. His

224 Ibid.
225 Ibid.
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first choice was Thomas Pownall, Lord Loudoun’s "Secretary Extraordinary" in
the British colonies. Pow nall’s popularity and influence was on the rise w ithin
the colonial administration. Pownall insisted that m any o f Penn’s instructions
and constraints be lifted before he would accept the o f proprietary
governorship. Penn refused and Pownall declined the office.227
Pownall circulated a list o f his reasons for refusing the Pennsylvania
governorship.228 In effect, the document comprised a critical annotation o f the
proprietary instructions. Pownall took issue w ith Penn’s insistence that the
governor help foster the creation of settlements in w estern Pennsylvania. W hile
R obert H unter M orris could declare that as governor he had been unaw are of
Indian dissatisfaction with Pennsylvania’s land acquisitions, Pownall could not
not make the same assurance from his vantage point. Pownall opposed the
settlem ent o f the Ohio country on the grounds that it was a "measure highly
offensive" to the Indians.

"The Indians look upon those Lands as rightly

belonging to them ," he declared o f the Albany Purchase territory, "and have
several times Declared their Resolution not to part with th em ." Pownall
harkened back to W illiam Penn’s original intent w hen he recom m ended that the
proprietary discourage settlement "on Lands claimed by the Indians, until the

227 John A. Shutz, Thomas Pownall. British Defender o f A m erican Liberty: A
Study o f A nglo-Am erican Relations in the Eighteenth Century (Glendale,
California: The A rthur H. Clark Company, 1951), 70-71.
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Rights be settled to their satisfation. "229

229 "Governor Pownalls Reasons For Declining The Governm ent o f
Pennsylvania," PM H B . XIII, 445-46.
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